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INTRODUCTION

The silver lining behind the Supreme Court's decision to disintegrate the
Seattle and Louisville public schools is that the decision also runs the risk of
disintegrating judicial review. Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School DistrictNo. 11 holds that the Constitution bars voluntary, raceconscious efforts by two local school boards to retain the racial integration that
they worked so hard to achieve after Brown.2 In so holding, the Court curiously
reads the Equal Protection Clause as preventing the use of race to pursue actual
equality, and instead insists on a type offormal "equality" that has historically
been associated with thinly veiled efforts to disguise racial oppression-the
type of oppression that the Court authorized in upholding the separate-but-equal
regime of Plessy.3 By using the Constitution to protect passive resegregation
from active integration, the current Court ends up constitutionalizingthe culture's regression to the days of greater racial separation-a separation that
Brown found to be "inherently unequal." 4 As a result, the new Resegregation
decision has not only realigned the current Court with its own racially oppres-

1 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (invalidating race-conscious efforts to prevent resegregation of

public schools in consolidated cases involving Seattle, Washington and Louisville/Jefferson
County, Kentucky) [hereinafter referred to as "ParentsInvolved' or the "Resegregation"case].
2 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1) (invalidating maintenance of
racially segregated public schools); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 757 (1955)
(Brown 11) (requiring desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed"). Even the use
of facially neutral criteria might well be viewed as racially discriminatory if the intent of the
school board in using those criteria were to promote racial integration. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229,238-48 (1976) (adopting intent requirement to establish equal protection
violation); cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-30 (2003) (holding that pursuit of racial
balance would be a "patently unconstitutional" effort to impose racial quotas (quoting Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.))).
3 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of
separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities, by finding that segregation
did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause). Plessy
was formally overruled in Brown. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493-95 (holding that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."). Unlike Plessy, which presumed equal treatment
of all races, ParentsInvolved did invalidate the use of express racial classifications-although it
did not impose any sort of equality requirement, which was presumed to exist even in Plessy.
The two cases are analogous, however, in their focus on the formal "equality" of treating all
races the same, while ignoring the actual harm that both decisions would foreseeably inflict on
the racial minorities who were disadvantaged by the decisions. This point is discussed in greater
detail in Part II.A infra.
4 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493-95 (holding that "separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.").
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sive past, but it has also distanced the Court from the nation's hope for a
racially progressive future. Once the decision is understood in this way, the
question becomes whether the case will begin to undermine the legitimacy
needed for the Court to continue its activist conception of judicial review.
Because the views of the Justices seem so transparently political, the threat to
judicial legitimacy that emanates from the Resegregation case may end up
exceeding the nation's patience for continued Supreme Court interference in
the nation's racial policymaking process. There can be no assurance that the
case will prompt such a reconsideration of judicial review. But one can at least
hope that it will.
Part I of this Article describes the manner in which the Resegregation
decision has marginalized the importance of racial integration. Part I.A.
describes the Seattle and Louisville integration plans under consideration in the
case. Part I.B. describes the various Supreme Court opinions issued in the
decision invalidating those plans. Part II discusses the impact that the
Resegregation decision is likely to have on the nation's ever-evolving conception of equality. Part II.A. explains how the decision effectively overrules
Brown-by protecting the interests of disappointed white parents at the cost of
advancing racial resegregation--despite the fact that it is doctrinally difficult to
support such a result. Part lI.B. argues that the plurality opinion of Chief
Justice Roberts now gives official recognition to an updated form of racism, in
which supposed "equality" is used as a tool of racial oppression. Part III
discusses the effect that the decision is likely to have on the future of judicial
review. Part II.A. illustrates that the decision to invalidate the integration
plans at issue can best be understood as political rather than doctrinal in nature.
Part HI.B. expresses the hope that such transparent judicial politics will cause
the Supreme Court to lose the perceived legitimacy that it needs to continue
supplanting the racial policy preferences adopted by the representative branches
of government. The Conclusion suggests that, while one may hope for the
disintegration of undemocratically activist judicial review, the long persistence
of racial oppression in the United States does not afford much basis for optimism in achieving that end.

I. DISINTEGRATING THE SCHOOLS
The likely effect of the Supreme Court's ParentsInvolved decision will be
to promote racial resegregation of the nation's schools, thereby undermining the
strenuous efforts that some school boards have made to achieve integration in
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the aftermath of Brown. Although the Court suggests that race-neutral strategies can still be used to maintain integration, 5 experience suggests that those
strategies will not work. 6 The prevalence of residential segregation in the
United States, 7 combined with the frequent failures of race-neutral efforts to
secure integration in the past,8 suggests that the effectiveness of race-neutral
remedies for resegregation is more likely to be theoretical than real. Moreover,
the prominence of this belief at the time the case was decided suggests that the
Supreme Court majority in ParentsInvolved was intentionally subordinating
actual integration to an abstract conception of colorblindness when it chose to
tolerate the foreseeable resegregation of public schools. 9 Stated more succinctly, when white parents were disappointed by the failure of their children to
receive the school assignments that the parents desired, the Supreme Court was
willing to elevate the interests of those disappointed white parents above the
more general societal interest in promoting racial integration of the schools. As
a result, the message conveyed to racial minorities by the Resegregation
decision-and fortified by the political leanings of the Justices who joined itis a message of hostility to the idea of racial inclusion. 10 As a rap music aficionado might put it, the Supreme Court majority in the Resegregationcase
chose simply to disregard the policies of local school boards concerning racial
diversity, in order to dis integration. 1

5 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760-61 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (favoring
use of race-neutral alternatives); id. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same).
6See, e.g., id. at 2828-30, 2831-34, 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 2768-70
(Thomas, J., concurring) (conceding that defacto segregation is likely to result, but calling it
lack of "racial balance" rather than "segregation").
7 See id. at 2747, 2755, 2758 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (discussing effects of
residential segregation); id. at 2769, 2775 (Thomas, J. concurring) (same); id. at 2791 (Kennedy
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (same); id. at 2802-05, 2820-22, 2829
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (same); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480,

488 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing residential and school segregation).
8 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2828-30, 2831-34, 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing race-neutral failures).
9 See id. at 2751-52; (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (subordinating importance of racial
balance to interest in race neutrality); id. at 2758-59 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (same);
id. at 2768-70 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).
10See id. at 2798-2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for its failure to
distinguish between inclusion and exclusion of racial minorities); id. at 2815-17 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (same).
11In the vernacular of black English, that has crossed over into more mainstream culture
through the popularity of rap music, the term "dis" or "diss" is commonly used to convey the
notion of disrespect. See Wikipedia, Dissing,
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A. The Cases
Schools in the United States have historically been segregated. Although
Brown v. BoardofEducationinvalidated the dejure segregation that used to be
common in many parts of the nation, most schools in the United States have
failed to achieve any meaningful level of actual integration in the fifty-three
years that have elapsed since Brown was decided.' 2 That is due largely to widespread defacto segregation, which is primarily traceable to residential housing
patterns. Moreover, as a result of current resegregation trends, schools are now
becoming more segregated rather than more integrated. 13 It is, therefore,
noteworthy when a local school board has both the inclination and the ability to
produce a degree of racial balance that reflects the racial composition of the
overall district in which the school board governs. After years of effort, both
the Jefferson County, Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington, school boards were
able to achieve an unusual degree of racial balance for the cities of Louisville
and Seattle respectively-even though the schools in both cities had been
highly segregated in the past. The school boards did this by voluntarily
adopting integration plans that both paid attention to race, and imposed restrictions on student assignments that would exacerbate racial imbalance. When
disappointed white parents challenged the explicit use of race in those integration plans, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits rejected the
challenge and upheld the plans. However, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court
vioreversed and invalidated the plans, holding that their explicit use of race
4
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.'
1. Louisville
Louisville had historically maintained a dejure segregated school system,
and from 1975 to 2000, the school district operated under a federal court
desegregation decree that required the district to pursue in its schools specified
racial percentage ranges that reflected the student racial makeup of the district
as a whole. The decree was dissolved in 2000, when the District Court held
that Louisville had achieved unitary status. Nevertheless, from 2001 to the
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilDissing (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
12See STONE ET AL.,

supra note 7, at 488-500 (discussing successes and failures of

desegregation efforts in the North and the South).
13See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2801-02, 2833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
statistics about present racial segregation in public schools); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
299 n.4 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same); Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL.
L. REV. 277, 277-78 (2007) (same); STONE ETrAL., supra note 7, at 488-500 (same).
14See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
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present, Louisville operated under a voluntarily adopted integration plan that
was designed to maintain the level of integration achieved under the previous
desegregation decree. Virtually all students in the Louisville school system are
either black or white, with blacks comprising 34% of the student body, and
whites and others comprising the remaining 66%. Accordingly, the Louisville
plan classified students as either "black" or "other," and sought to maintain a
black student population in each affected school of at least 15%, and not more
than 50%. That established a range in which the level of integration at each
school was within plus or minus 20% of the actual racial balance in the overall
school district. When students first entered the school system, or sought to
transfer to another school within the system, they were permitted to attend the
schools of their choice. However, student choices were subject to space limitations, and to the percentage limitations imposed by the racial integration
guidelines. 15
When Crystal Meredith moved to the Louisville school district in August
2002, space limitations precluded the assignment of her white son to the school
that was nearest his home, and he was assigned instead to a school that was 10
miles away. When Meredith requested that her son be transferred to another
school that was nearer her home, that request was denied on the ground that her
son's assignment to that school would cause the school to fall outside the
integration range established by the racial guidelines. Meredith then sued the
school board, challenging the constitutionality of the racial guidelines. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky found that the
school board's use of race was constitutional, because it was narrowly tailored
to advance the board's compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse
affirmed, but the United
schools. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
16
certiorari.
granted
then
Court
States Supreme
2. Seattle
Like the Louisville schools, the Seattle public schools also had a history of
alleged dejure segregation, which was challenged before both a federal court
and a federal administrative agency. Before the allegations of de jure
segregation were adjudicated, however, the dejure segregation claims were set-

15See id. at 2749-50 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 2806-09 (Breyer, J.,

dissenting). The racial guideline restrictions did not apply to magnet schools. See id. at 274950 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 2809 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 2750 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 2809 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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tied when the Seattle school board promised voluntarily to adopt an integration
plan. Initial versions of the plan included race-conscious student assignments,
as well as busing, in order to increase the integration of Seattle's racially imbalanced schools. Although those versions of the Seattle plan eventually succeeded in achieving a significant degree of racial balance, opposition to busing,
white flight, and the influx of Asian students led the board to substitute the plan
at issue in the ParentsInvolved case. That plan, which was in effect from 1999
to 2002, abandoned busing as a technique for promoting integration, and
substituted a system of constrained student choice. Students were permitted to
attend the schools of their choice, subject to four "tiebreaker" restrictions that
resolved competing claims for assignment to oversubscribed schools. The
tiebreaker first gave a preference to students with siblings in the desired school;
second to students who were not in a race that was overrepresented in the desired school; third to students residing in the neighborhood of the desired
school; and fourth to students who received child care in the neighborhood of
the desired school. The plan also sought to reduce the emphasis that race had
played in earlier versions of the integration plan.17
For purposes of deciding whether a race was overrepresented in a racially
imbalanced school, the school board classified students as being either "white"
or "nonwhite."' 8 It considered a school to be "racially imbalanced" if the
nonwhite student population of the school deviated by more than plus or minus
15% from the student racial composition of the school district as a whole. 19
While the Seattle integration plan at issue was in use, the student population of
the Seattle school district was 41% white, and 59% nonwhite (including student
populations that were 23.8% Asian, 23.1% black, 10.3% Latino, and 2.8% indigenous Indian). 20 The current version of the Seattle plan was in effect for
only the three school years ranging from 1999-2002, because the board ceased
using the plan when the plan was challenged in court. 2 1 During the time that

17See id. at 2746-48 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 2801-06 (Breyer, J.,

dissenting).
18See id. at 2747 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
19See id. at 2747 n.3 (noting that the target percentage increased from 10% to 15% for the
2001-2002 school year). See also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
426 F.3d 1162, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 2005) (Court of Appeals decision describing Seattle plan in
more 20detail).
See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747, 2747 n.3 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
21 See id. at 2746 n. 1, 2751 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 2805-06 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Because the District Court record was closed before the start of the 2001-2002
school year, the record contained no student assignment data for that year. See id. at 2746 n. 1
(Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
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the tiebreaker applied, it affected only about 300 of the district's approximately
50,000 students per year, and 97% of all students in the school system received
their first or second choices in school assignments. Students who did not
receive their first or second choices, were permitted to transfer to the school of
their choice the following year without regard to the racial guidelines. As a
result, no student was required to spend more than one year in a school that was
not the student's first or second choice.22
A nonprofit corporation called Parents Involved In Community Schoolscomprised of parents who objected to Seattle's use of a racial tiebreaker in
making school assignments-sued the Seattle school board alleging constitutional and statutory violations, including a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. In a series of lower court decisions, the challenges were ultimately
rejected by the Washington Supreme Court, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit after rehearing en banc. Like the Sixth Circuit in the
Louisville case, the Ninth Circuit found that the integration plan was narrowly
tailored to advance the school board's compelling interest in promoting racial
23
diversity. However, the United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
Both the Louisville and Seattle integration plans evolved over decades of
experimentation and accumulated school board expertise. Although initial
versions of the plans were largely ineffective, subsequent versions became
increasingly more effective, and the plans eventually produced meaningful
levels of integration in the Louisville and Seattle schools. The versions of the
plans that were considered by the Supreme Court sought to minimize the role
that race had played in earlier incarnations of the plans, while simultaneously
increasing student choice and protecting the levels of racial balance that had
finally been achieved. Both the Louisville and Seattle cases, therefore, presented clearly the issue of whether race-conscious efforts to promote integration
and prevent resegregation could be used for student assignments in a marginal
number of cases where other integration strategies had failed to work in the
past. 24 The Louisville and Seattle cases were argued separately before the Supreme Court,25 but were consolidated for disposition in the ParentsInvolved
decision.26

See id. at 2805-06 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
id. at 2748-49 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
24 See id. at 2809-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

22

23 See

25 See Meredith v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (granting
certiorari) (oral argument at http:lwww.oyez.orglcasesl2000-200912006/2006_05_915/);
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B. The Opinions
In ParentsInvolved, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a 5-4 majority opinion for
the Supreme Court invalidating the Louisville and Seattle integration plans. He
relied heavily on Brown in holding that the use of race to promote integration
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling interest in student diversity. 1 Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas and Alito joined that opinion. However, Justice Kennedy declined to
join the four-Justice plurality portions of the opinion, which seemed
categorically to preclude any use of race to promote integration in de facto
segregated schools. 9 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, emphasizing
his belief that the Constitution required prospective colorblindness, even in the
face of defacto resegregation.30 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion,
arguing that the explicit use of race might be permissible in some instances to
promote the integration of defacto segregated schools, if race-neutral efforts
were first shown to be unavailing. 3' As the Justice casting the "swing vote" on
this issue, Justice Kennedy's position will likely be dispositive in future cases.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, denouncing the "cruel irony"
entailed in the invocation of Brown by Chief Justice Roberts to justify the
resegregation of public schools.32 Justice Breyer wrote the primary dissent,
arguing that the Roberts majority had misapplied Brown-as well as the
Court's post-Brown desegregation precedents-in a way that undermined the
promise of integrated education. 33 Justice Breyer' s dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.34
1. Invalidatingthe Plans
Three Justices wrote opinions supporting invalidation of the Louisville and
Seattle integration plans. Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion, parts of
which were joined by a majority of the Court, and parts of which were joined
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (granting
certiorari)(oral argument at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006-05-908/).
26 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
27 See id. at 2746, 2751-54, 2759-61 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
28 See id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
29 See id. at 2746, 2755-59, 2761-68 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
30 See id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring).
31 See id. at 2791-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
32 See id. at 2797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33 See id. at 2800-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34 See id. at 2800.
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by a plurality. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, and Justice
Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment.
a. ChiefJustice Roberts
The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts rested squarely on
the proposition that all racial classifications, whether benign or invidious, are
subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Because the Louisville and Seattle integration plans sometimes made explicit use of race in
assigning students to racially oversubscribed schools, those plans were subject
to strict scrutiny.35 As a result, the plans could be upheld only if they were
shown to constitute narrowly tailored efforts to advance a compelling governmental interest. In the educational context, only two governmental interests had
ever been recognized as compelling: the interest in remedying the effects of
past intentional discrimination; and the interest in promoting diversity in higher
education. The interest in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination did not apply under the facts of Parents Involved, because both the
Louisville and Seattle school districts were unitary at the time that the integration plans were adopted. Accordingly, there was at that time no past
intentional discrimination to remedy, and the Constitution did not permit the
use of racial classifications to remedy mere defacto segregation or racial imbalance. 36 Although the Supreme Court had held four years earlier, in Grutterv.
Bollinger,37 that the pursuit of student diversity in higher education could
constitute a compelling governmental interest, the integration plans at issue in
Parents Involved concerned primary and secondary education rather than
higher education. Moreover, the Louisville and Seattle plans were not narrowly
tailored efforts to advance Grutterdiversity, because the binary focus of those
plans on only "black" and "white" racial balance-without the holistic, individualized consideration of other factors that can contribute to student
diversity-made the integration plans impermissibly overbroad.38 Because the
racial guidelines affected only a small percentage of students-3% in Louisville, and fifty-two students in Seattle-the use of race had not been shown to
be necessary for student diversity. In addition, the Louisville and Seattle school

" See id. at 2751-54 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
36 See id. at 2751-52.
17 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
38 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753-54 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
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boards had not adequately demonstrated that they engaged in a serious, goodfaith consideration of race-neutral alternatives.39
In the plurality portions of his opinion-which were joined by Justices
Scalia, Thomas and Alito-Chief Justice Roberts distinguished more forcefully
between the holistic diversity found to be compelling in Grutter,and the binary
racial diversity that was pursued in Louisville and Seattle. Roberts asserted that
it was not necessary to determine whether an interest in mere racial diversity
could be compelling, because the integration plans at issue were not narrowly
tailored to the "educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial
diversity." There is no evidence that replicating the racial demographics of a
school district "has a marked impact on test scores and other objective
yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits." Therefore, the integration plans at issue were "directed only to racial balance pure and simple, an
objective that this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.'" 4 In fact,
the pertinent definitions of diversity were so binary that, in Seattle, a student
body that was 50% white and 50% Asian would be considered diverse, while a
student body that was 30% Asian, 25% black, 25% Latino, and 20% white
would be considered racially concentrated.4' Unlike the diversity plan upheld
in Grutter,the Louisville and Seattle integration plans set their diversity targets
simply by counting back from the goal of "outright racial balancing"-a goal
that has repeatedly been held to be "patently unconstitutional"-because it fails
to treat citizens as individuals, and instead treats them as mere members of
racial groups.4 2 Chief Justice Roberts then found that the two plans suffered
from defects present in other invalid affirmative action programs, including the
absence of a "logical stopping point," and the desire to remedy mere "societal
discrimination. 43 The plans were simply using the semantic concepts of
"racial integration" and "racial diversity" to camouflage a constitutionally
impermissible effort to achieve racial balance. 44
Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the Court's post-Brown desegregation
precedents-including McDaniel v. Barresi,45 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
47
Board of Education,46 Crawford v. Board ofEducation, School Committee of

39 See id. at 2759-61.
40 See id. at 2755 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).

See id. at 2756.
See id. at 2757-58 (quoting Grutter,539 U.S. at 330).
43 Id. at 2758.
44 See id. at 2758-59.
4' 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971).
46 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
41

42
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Boston v. Board of Education,48 and Grutter v. Bollingera9-were not
controlling under the doctrine of stare decisis, because those cases involved
remedies for de jure segregation, rather than efforts to prevent the de facto
resegregation that Louisville and Seattle sought to address. 50 As a result,
Brown itself compelled the conclusion that the Louisville and Seattle plans
were unconstitutional in their assignment of students to particular schools on
the basis of race. The fact that the school boards may have had benign integrationist motives was irrelevant, because strict scrutiny applies to all racial
classifications-regardless of whether their motivations are benignly inclusive
or invidiously exclusive. Although developing student school assignment plans
can be a complex process, no deference is owed to local school boards in determining the constitutionality of those plans. 51 Chief Justice Roberts expressly
reserved the question of whether race could be used to promote diversity
through other means-such as school sitings, or the establishment of magnet
school-stating that those questions implicated different constitutional
considerations.52 Finally, Chief Justice Roberts reiterated his belief that Brown
compelled the result in Parents Involved, because Brown established the
proposition that racial classification and separation denoted inferiority in a way
that was "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality., 53 Chief Justice Roberts ended the plurality opinion with
his own version of an oft-quoted sentiment, asserting that "[t]he way to stop
discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
54
race."

4' 458 U.S.
48

527, 535 (1962).

352 Mass. 693, 695, 700 (1967); appeal dismissed for want of substantialfederal

question, 389 U.S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (a disposition of the merits and a Supreme Court
precedent).
49 539 U.S. at 324-25, 330, 337.
50 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2761-64 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
"' See id. at 2764-68.
52

See id. at 2766.

3 See id. at 2767-68 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 214

(1995)).
54 See id. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). In his Ninth Circuit dissent, Judge Bea
had stated that "It]he way to end racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by race." See
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,426 F.3d 1162, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea also quoted Professor Van Alstyne's assertion that "one gets
beyond racism by getting beyond it now." See id. at 1221 (quoting California Supreme Court
Justice Stanley Mosk in Price v. Civil Serv. Comm., 26 Cal.3d 257, 299 (1980) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting), who was himself quoting William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 809-10 (1979)).
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b. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, while fully joining the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts,
wrote his own concurring opinion to address several contentions made in
Justice Breyer's dissent. Justice Thomas rejected the dissent's assertion that
resegregation was occurring in Louisville and Seattle; that the school boards
had a present interest in remedying past segregation; and that the two racebased assignment plans served a compelling state interest. As a result, the
plans were not only unconstitutional, but they gave the local school boards a
free hand to make decisions based on race 55in a way that was reminiscent of the
segregationist arguments made in Brown.
Justice Thomas rejected the dissent's claim that the Louisville and Seattle
school districts were threatened with resegregation, because for Thomas, mere
racial imbalance did not amount to segregation. Segregation had to be dejure
in nature, and the asserted resegregation at issue in Parents Involved was
simply de facto racial imbalance, produced primarily by private residential
choices. Accordingly, the dissent's reverential embrace of "integration"
amounted to nothing more than a preference for unconstitutional racial
balancing. 6 Moreover, the Louisville and Seattle plans were not necessary for
the schools to preserve their "hard-won gains," because the only pertinent gain
at issue was the prevention of a de jure segregated dual school systemsomething that did not presently exist in either Louisville or Seattle.f The two
school boards also lacked any interest in using race-based remedies for past
segregation. Such remedies are constitutionally available only to redress the
effects of formal segregation by law, or the effects of past discrimination for
which the school board itself is responsible-neither of which was at issue in
Parents Involved.58 As a result, post-Brown precedents allowing race-based
desegregation remedies-such as Swann,59 McDaniel,6° and Green v. County
School Board61-are exceptional cases responding to massive resistance, which
are simply inapplicable in a de facto context.62 Contrary to the dissent's
suggestion, it is not difficult to distinguish defacto from dejure segregation,

55
56
57
58
59

See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring).

See id. at 2768-70.

See id. at 2770 n.3.
See id. at 2770-73.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1971).
60 McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971).
61391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
62 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2771 nn.5-6 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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and only the threat of de facto resegregation was present in Louisville and
Seattle.6 3 In the absence of formal findings that establish school board
involvement in uncured past discrimination, the school boards were simply
trying to remedy "general societal discrimination." 64 The dissent is, therefore,
incorrect when it challenges the coherence of holding that a remedy could be
constitutionally compelled one day but constitutionally impermissible the next.
There is nothing incoherent in concluding that race-based remedies are permissible only as long as there is some prior discrimination to remedy. 65 Remedies
for segregation are discrete, one-time remedies, but remedies for mere racial
imbalance would have to66 be indefinite in order to keep pace with constantly
changing demographics.
Justice Thomas accused the dissent of applying a watered-down version of
strict scrutiny, which sought to distinguish between benign and invidious
discrimination. Although Court of Appeals Judges Kozinski and Boudin had
agued in favor of applying a relaxed standard of review to integration efforts
that were benign rather than oppressive in nature, Supreme Court precedentsincluding Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pefia,67 Grutter v. Bollinger,68 and
Johnson v. California69--squarelyrejected that view. Strict scrutiny applied to
all racial classifications, whether benign or invidious. Moreover, there was
nothing benign about racial paternalism that excluded students from schools
based on their race. 70 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the integration plans
at issue in ParentsInvolved could not survive genuine strict scrutiny for three
reasons.
First, the dissent had not identified any compelling interest in remedying
prior segregation that did not ultimately amount to a mere interest in
counteracting the effects of societal or residential segregation-an interest that
would have no logical stopping point.7'
Second, the school boards also lacked any educational justification for
promoting integration, because the existing social science evidence was too
contested to establish reliably that integration was beneficial for black students.
63

See id. at 2771 n.4.

64
See id. at 2772.
65

See id. at 2772 n.8.
66 See id. at 2773.
67 515 U.S. 200, 227, 241 (1995).
6'539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
69
70 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2774-75 (Thomas, J., concurring).
"' See id. at 2775-76.
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Moreover, strict scrutiny precluded mere judicial deference to local school
boards with respect to the presence of such educational benefits.72 In such an
inconclusive context, Supreme Court Justices should not play the role of
activist social engineers seeking to solve society's racial problems.73
Third, no "democratic element" in producing an educational environment
reflective of our "pluralistic society" constituted a compelling interest. That
interest was too abstract to have any meaning distinct from mere racial
balancing. Moreover, school tracking and self-segregation might well prevent
any such racial-interaction benefits from occurring even in nominally
"integrated" schools. 74 Not only was the social science again too contested to
support such an interest, but if the Supreme Court were to take sides in such an
educational policy debate, it would imprudently be replicating the error of
Lochner.75 Justice Thomas distinguished the compelling diversity interest
recognized in Grutter by asserting that Grutter was limited to the context of
higher education-a context in which special emphasis was placed on freedoms
of speech and thought, and where schools made educational judgments in
selecting their student bodies.76 The interests of the Louisville and Seattle
school boards could not be compelling because, in the past, the only government interests that had been recognized as compelling were government
interests in preventing anarchy or violence, and in remedying past discrimination for which the government was itself responsible.77
Justice Thomas ended his concurrence by endorsing the conception of
78
colorblindness articulated by Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.
He accused the dissent of being pragmatic and instrumental in its constitutional
interpretation-just as the Court had been in Plessy79-and then asserted that
the dissent was arguing for the same sort of deference to local practice and
expertise that the segregationists had argued for in Brown. Like Justice
Breyer' s dissent, the segregationists in Brown had also argued that the decision
72 See id. at 2776-79.
73 See id. at 2779 n.14.
74 See id. at 2779-8 1.
75 See id. at 2779 n. 15 (quoting "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert

Spencer's Social Science." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
76 See id. at 2775-79; 2781-82.
77

See id. at 2782.

See id. at 2782 (quoting "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
79 See id. at 2782-83.
78
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would be disruptive and productive of litigation; that it failed to follow
precedent; that it failed to recognize the benign racial consequences that were
intended to flow from the racial classification at issue; and that the Court
should not undo the racial progress that had already been achieved.80 Justice
Thomas labeled the dissent's preference for racial inclusion over racial
separation a "faddish" theory and cautioned
that our history has taught us to
81
"beware of elites bearing social theories."
c. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion sought to stake out a middle ground
between the positions taken by Chief Justice Roberts in his plurality opinion
and Justice Breyer in dissent. Justice Kennedy agreed with the Roberts
majority that the Louisville and Seattle integration programs were unconstitutional, because they were not narrowly tailored efforts to advance the government' s compelling interest in diversity. However, he did not agree with the
Roberts plurality that
the school boards had failed to identify a compelling
82
diversity.
in
interest
Because the Louisville and Seattle integration plans made express use of
race in allocating educational benefits and burdens, the plans were subject to
strict scrutiny. The school boards, therefore, bore the burden of showing that
their plans were narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental
interest. In order to apply that constitutional standard, the plans had to be
thoroughly understood to determine whether they were genuinely benign or
remedial on the one hand, or motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or racial politics on the other. They also had to be thoroughly understood
to determine whether less restrictive alternatives existed for advancing any
compelling interest that might exist. However, the Louisville and Seattle
school boards did not meet their burden of showing that strict scrutiny was
satisfied, because the application of their racial guidelines was too confused and
self-contradictory to be narrowly tailored. For example, the Louisville plan was
applied to deny a desired kindergarten transfer to Crystal Meredith's son, but
the plan sometimes stated that it did not apply to kindergartens, while at other
times stating that it did. In addition, there were several other unexplained

80

See id. at 2783-86 (citing claims that racial segregation under Plessy was racially

beneficial, and that the Supreme Court should not undo the progress that had already been
made).
s See id. at 2787-88.
82 See id. at 2788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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ambiguities and inconsistencies in the way that the Louisville plan operated.
The Seattle plan was similarly confusing, because the school board had not explained why its interest in diversifying schools in a multiracial school system
could be satisfied by classifying students merely as "white" or "nonwhite."
Accordingly, neither the Louisville nor the Seattle school boards had demonstrated that their plans were narrowly tailored to advance the asserted interest in
diversity.83
Justice Kennedy believed that the aspirational goal of the Constitution was
that race should not matter, but he also believed that in reality race often did
matter. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the Chief Justice's "alltoo-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my
view, it may be taken into account." 84 Fifty years of experience since Brown
indicated that the Roberts plurality's belief that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race"
was overly simplistic. To the extent that the Roberts plurality could be read as
requiring school districts to ignore de facto resegregation, Justice Kennedy
could not agree. Similarly, the colorblindness advocated by Justice Harlan in
his Plessy dissent, made sense in the context of Plessy, but could not be
universally applied in other contexts. 85 When student body composition interferes with equal educational opportunity, school boards are free to devise raceconscious measures to address the problem, as long as those measures do not
systematically type students by race. Accordingly, measures including raceconscious school site selection, gerrymandered attendance zones, and the
establishment of magnet schools might be permissible. Because such measures
would not tell students that they were defined by race, they would not be
subject to strict scrutiny. Rather, they would be analogous to the manner in
which race is used in drawing facially neutral election district lines-a process
in which race consciousness has been constitutionally permitted for generations. 86 In the present case, however, the number of students affected by the
Louisville and Seattle integration plans is so small that the school boards did
not negate the existence of less restrictive alternatives to the use of race-conscious student assignment. Such alternatives might include the race-conscious

83

See id. at 2788-91.

84See id. at 2791.

See id. at 2791-92.

86 See id. at 2792. Although Justice Kennedy does not cite his work, Professor Goodwin

Liu has argued that the Louisville and Seattle integration plans should be controlled by the
Supreme Court's redistricting cases, rather than by the Court's affirmative action cases. See
Liu, supra note 13, at 301-09.
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but facially neutral measures mentioned above, or other more nuanced
87
measures that the school boards might devise in accordance with Grutter.
Justice Kennedy appears to agree with the Roberts majority that the
diversity interest invoked in Parents Involved is not the same as the more
holistic and individualized diversity interest found to be compelling in Grutter.
However, the interests in remedying past intentional discrimination, or in
promoting Grutter-type diversity, might still inform the constitutional analysis
in ParentsInvolved.8 8 Nevertheless, the dissent's application of strict scrutiny
was so permissive that it approximated rational basis review, and would
authorize widespread governmental use of racial classifications. Although the
dissent claimed to be applying Grutter89 and Gratz v. Bollinger,9" those cases
are not controlling. The undergraduate affirmative action plan at issue in Gratz
involved less consideration of race than the ParentsInvolved plans, but was
still held unconstitutional-thereby establishing afortiorithe unconstitutionality of the Louisville and Seattle plans. And the law school affirmative action
plan upheld in Gruttergave much more individualized consideration to a range
of diversity factors than the mechanical plans at issue in ParentsInvolved. 91
The dissent sought to minimize the distinction between de facto and de jure
segregation in assessing the constitutionality of racial classifications, but the
Court's post-Brown precedents-including Swann92 and Green93-were limited
to de jure segregation in their authorization of extraordinary race-based remedies. Such remedies are not available for mere defacto societal discrimination.
It is true that the victims of discrimination can be harmed just as much by de
facto as dejure discrimination; that it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish
de facto from de jure discrimination; and that the primary function of the
distinction has historically been to limit the reach of judicial-as opposed to
political-remedies for discrimination. Nevertheless, the distinction is still an
important one. Racial classifications are among the most pernicious actions

87 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
88
See id. at 2793-94.
89 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340-41.

90 539 U.S. 244,251 (2003) (invalidating affirmative action plan for undergraduate student
admissions at the University of Michigan).
91 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
92 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Rd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1971).
93 Green v. County Sch. Rd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
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that a government can take, and the de jure limitation serves to cabin the
government's use of race. 94
Justice Kennedy noted that, when considering the resegregation issue in
Court of Appeals cases, Judges Kozinski and Boudin expressed the view that
direct racial remedies should be available to cure the problem of racial isolation
in schools. However, the inefficiency that results from limiting the direct use of
racial classifications is warranted, because indirect uses of race are less
dangerous. Racial categorizations are difficult to apply; they can be divisive;
and race can be used as a political bargaining chip. But race-conscious
measures that are facially neutral are less harmful. Moreover, the duality
resulting from recognizing that race has caused a problem, while resisting the
use of race to solve that problem, is simply a duality that is built into the Equal
Protection Clause. 95 The nation has a moral obligation to promote racial integration, but it must fulfill that obligation in ways that treat race as one of many
factors. The crude and stigmatizing reduction of school children to racial chits
cannot be tolerated-at least not until all other measures have been exhausted.
Therefore, school districts are free to continue pursuing racial integration, but
they must do so without
the widespread use of racial classifications to allocate
96
burdens.
and
benefits
2. Supporting the Plans
Two Justices wrote dissenting opinions supporting the Louisville and
Seattle integration plans. Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissenting opinion, and
Justice Breyer wrote a long opinion that served as the primary dissent.
a. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissenting opinion in Parents Involved, in
which he joined what he termed the "eloquent and unanswerable" dissent of
Justice Breyer. He wrote separately to denounce the "cruel irony" of the Chief
Justice's reliance on Brown to support his decision. 97 Justice Stevens emphasized that Brown involved discrimination against black schoolchildren, noting
that there were no reports of white children wishing to attend black segregated

94 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2794-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
95 See id. at 2796-97.
96 See id. at 2797.
97 Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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schools. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts ignored this important contextual
fact and rewrote Brown in a way that equated racial discrimination against
blacks with race-conscious efforts to promote the very integration that Brown
sought to achieve. 98 Chief Justice Roberts disregarded the distinction between
using race for inclusionary purposes and using it for exclusionary purposes,
relying on only a series of split decisions-such as Adarand9 9-that applied
strict scrutiny to both benign and invidious uses of race. The cases decided
1°°
between Brown and Adarand-including School Committee of Boston,
Swann,'0' and Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Boardof Educationl°2 -demonstrate
that rigid Supreme Court adherence to the three tiers of equal protection
scrutiny have obscured the meaning of Brown. Although those cases made it
clear that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit race-based student
assignments that were designed to promote integration, the Roberts majority
failed to follow those precedents. Justice Stevens then noted that the Court had
changed since those cases were decided, stating "[it is my firm conviction that
no member10 3of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today's
'
decision."
b. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer wrote the primary dissent in ParentsInvolved, which was
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg. 10 4 He argued that the
Louisville and Seattle integration plans were similar to many other primary and
secondary school plans developed throughout the nation in the fifty years since
Brown was decided, in that they all sought to fulfill the integration promise of
Brown by adopting techniques that the Supreme Court had previously required,
permitted, and encouraged local school boards to take. Accordingly, the governmental interest at stake was "compelling," and the plans at issue were as
"narrowly tailored" as other plans that the Court had previously approved.
Moreover, the Court had in the past recognized that the Constitution permits
local communities to adopt desegregation plans even when it does not require

98 See id. at 2797-2800.
99 Adarand
100

Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Bd. of Educ., 352 Mass. 693 (1967); appeal dismissedfor

want of substantialfederal question, 389 U.S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (a disposition of the
merits and a Supreme Court precedent).
101402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
'02
439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978).
103 ParentsInvolved, 127 S.Ct. at 2798-2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 See id. at 2800 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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them to do so. Because the Roberts plurality paid inadequate attention to prior
law, context, and constitutional principle, it had reversed course and misapplied
precedent in a way that undermined the ability of local school boards to deal
with the problem of resegregation. As a result, the ParentsInvolved decision
threatened a disruptive round of race-related litigation that undermined Brown's
promise of primary and secondary school integration in a way that could not be
justified under the Equal Protection Clause. 105
Justice Breyer asserted that dozens of post-Brown Supreme Court cases
viewed the Constitution as requiring the use of race-conscious measures to
achieve school desegregation. In addition to what the Constitution required, a
unanimous Court in Swann also permitted local school boards to use race
conscious integration measures, giving the local boards broad discretion to
achieve the levels of racial balance that they deemed appropriate to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society. 10 6 A decade of experimentation
followed, in which various coerced and voluntary techniques ultimately resulted
in a significant degree of racial integration. Since 1968, however, integration
progress had stalled, and resegregation had emerged as a problem. Now, many
students attend racially isolated schools, and many school districts-including
Louisville and Seattle-have implemented race-conscious plans to remedy the
problem of resegregation. Three important lessons emerge from this history.
First, such integration efforts must reasonably be understood as narrowly
tailored efforts to advance a compelling governmental interest in promoting
integration. Second, the distinction between defacto and de jure discrimination is meaningless in the context of school segregation. Third, integration
efforts are realistically so complex that the Constitution cannot plausibly be
10 7
read to rule out categorically all race-conscious integration efforts.
Justice Breyer stressed that the Louisville and Seattle school districts had
both been segregated in ways that were alleged to be de jure. The de jure
segregation claims were adjudicated in Louisville, resulting in a desegregation
decree, but were settled prior to adjudication in Seattle. Nevertheless, both
school districts went through similar evolutionary cycles. The schools were
initially segregated; then desegregated with extensive use of busing; then resegregated as a result of population shifts; then subject to voluntary efforts to
combat resegregation through integration plans that deemphasized busing in

105 See id. at 2800-01.

See id. at 2801 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,16
(1971)).
'07

See id. at 2801-02.
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favor of racially constrained student choice. Both plans also experimented with
race-neutral alternatives, and sought to combat the problem of white flight. For
Justice Breyer, those histories illustrated the futility trying to distinguish
between defacto and de jure segregation as the basis for determining whether
race-conscious integration efforts were permissible. The mere presence or
absence of a court order could not be dispositive, because many southern school
districts that were segregated by law were later desegregated through voluntary
race-conscious measures without any court order. Moreover, a district like
Louisville that was initially subject to a desegregation decree, might adopt an
integration plan the day before the decree was dissolved, but fully intend to
continue using that plan the day after the dissolution of the decree. It would be
untenable to think that the plan was valid on the first day, but invalid the next
day. That was particularly true, because the McDanielCourt permitted the use
of a race-conscious remedy without any prior judicial decree. 10 8 The
why the law often defers to
complexity of achieving greater integration explains
°9
local officials in formulating integration plans.'
Justice Breyer cited "[a] longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority"
that he claimed permitted the use of "race-conscious criteria to achieve positive
race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel it."" He then,
for the second time in his opinion, quoted the following language from Swann:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate
and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that
in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion
for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the
broad discretionary powers of school authorities."I'
Justice Breyer noted that, although this language was technically dicta, it
asserted "a basic principle of constitutional law-a principle that has found
'wide acceptance in the legal culture.""' 2 Justice Breyer then cited other
114
cases-including North CarolinaBoard of Education v. Swann,' 13 Bustop,

108 See id. at 2809-11 (citing McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971)).
l'9 See id. at 2811.
"0 See id.
"' See id. at 2811-12 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,

16(1971)).

112See

id. at 2812 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).

"' 402 U.S. 43, 35 (1971).
114 Bustop, Inc. v. L.A. Bd. of Educ., 439

U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978).
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McDaniel,1 5 Board of Education v. Harris,1 6 Crawford,'1 7 and School
9
Committee of Boston' 18-that he claimed supported the Swann proposition. 11
The fact that numerous other federal and state courts reached the same
conclusion, both before and after Swann, illustrated that the principle
permitting race-conscious integration efforts had been adopted as the prevailing
view. 120 Congress and the President
had also taken numerous actions reflecting
121
their adherence to the principle.
Justice Breyer argued that such widespread adherence to the Swann
principle was not surprising, because the principle was consistent with the
intent of the fourteenth amendment drafters to end racial exclusion and give
former slaves full membership in American society. Accordingly, the
Constitution was almost always read to prohibit invidious discrimination, but it
was significantly more lenient in permitting benign race-conscious effortssuch as the efforts of the Freedman's Bureau to fund race-conscious school
integration programs. 122 Although there has been contemporary debate about
the advisability of distinguishing between invidious and benign uses of race, the
Supreme Court has never followed the "colorblind" approach of Justice
Thomas, and it has never repudiated the constitutional asymmetry between
actions that seek to exclude and actions that seek to include racial minorities.
The racially inclusive Louisville and Seattle plans were not meaningfully different from the voluntary race-conscious plan that
the Court upheld in McDaniel,
23
in accordance with the principle of Swann. 1
It was no answer to dismiss the unanimous legal principle of Swann as
mere dicta. The plurality would have to offer some reason why the Swann
principle did not control the Louisville and Seattle plans. The plurality claimed
only that later cases-Adarand,124 Johnson125 and Grutter'E6-have now

McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39,41 (1971).
444 U.S. 130, 148-49 (1979).
"17 Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1962).
118 Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Bd. of Educ., 352 Mass. 693 (1967); appeal dismissedfor
15

116

want of substantialfederal question, 389 U.S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (a disposition of the
merits and a Supreme Court precedent).
1190 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12 See id. at 2813-14.
121 See id. at 2814-15.
122 See id. at 2815.
123 See id. at 2815-16.
124 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
125 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
126 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
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supplanted Swann. 127 However, those more recent cases did not overrule
Swann, or hold that the distinction between racially inclusive and racially
exclusive programs was irrelevant. Indeed, they emphasized that the very purpose of strict scrutiny was to take account of relevant differences. Moreover,
those cases explicitly sought to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny" was
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact. ' 128 Grutterreinforced the distinction between
inclusive and exclusive programs, by emphasizing the importance of context in
ruling on the constitutionality of race-conscious plans, and by upholding the
race-conscious affirmative action plan that was there at issue. 129 Justice Breyer
believed that the Roberts plurality ignored both context and those prior
was always fatal, whether the
decisions in order to assert that strict scrutiny
130
program at issue was inclusive or exclusive.
According to Justice Breyer, another important contextual factor that the
plurality ignored was the fact that the Louisville and Seattle programs did not
seek to allocate goods or services on the basis of merit, or in any other way to
stigmatize or pit races against each other. Because the case did not involve
magnet schools, but rather involved schools whose popularity varied without
regard to race, no race-based harm could be said to result from application of
the programs. Indeed, it was this insight that caused lower court judges, such
as Judge Kozinski in the Court of Appeals, to argue for a more lenient standard
of review than strict scrutiny. A more lenient standard would not preclude
careful scrutiny of important contextual factors, but it would permit raceconscious integration plans in situations where their need was adequate to
overcome the dangers of their use-situations like the need to end racial
isolation in schools. Justice Breyer stated that he favored the application of a
more lenient standard of review, and noted that Justice Kennedy also agreed
that strict scrutiny need not be applied to all cases involving race-conscious
that the ParentsInvolved plans
integration efforts. Nevertheless, he believed
13
also satisfied traditional strict scrutiny. 1
Justice Breyer believed that the Louisville and Seattle plans served a
compelling governmental interest. Whether that interest was termed an interest
in diversity, racial balancing or integration, it had three important elements.
First, there was an "historical and remedial element" that sought not only to

127
See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2816 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128 See id. at 2816-17 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237, which in turn quoted Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
129 See id. at 2817-18.
0See id.
"'1
See id. at 2818-20.
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prevent resegregation, but to remedy the lingering effects of prior segregation
that was often de jure in nature-segregation that affected "not only schools,
but also housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and
social attitudes."'' 32 Second, there was an educational element that sought to
overcome the adverse educational effects of segregated schools, that was
supported by social science evidence suggesting that black students performed
better when moved from segregated to integrated educational environments.
Although the social science was contested, there is enough support for the educational benefits of integration to conclude that local school boards have a
compelling interest in pursuing integrated education. 33 Third, there was a
democratic element in creating an educational environment that reflected the
"pluralistic society" in which students would have to live.134 Social science
evidence also supported the conclusion that a diverse environment in which
children learned to work and play together promoted future racial cooperation.
Once again, even though the evidence was not uncontested, it provided
sufficient support to deem the interest compelling. Moreover, such beneficial
civic effects correspond to the types of interests that Grutter found to be
compelling in the context of higher education. Those effects are afortiorieven
more compelling in the formative years of primary and secondary education,
where children begin to absorb the values that they will carry with them for the
rest of their lives. Justice Breyer emphasized that Brown focused on primary
and secondary education, and not on higher education. 135 The government
interest at issue in Parents Involved, therefore was not a mere interest in
addressing general "societal discrimination," but rather was an interest in
"eradicating" primary and secondary school segregation. 136 The plurality's
suggestion that remedial and diversity interests could only be compelling in the
context of de jure segregation is inapposite, because the de factolde jure
distinction is relevant only to what the Constitution requires-not to what the
Constitution permits. Indeed, the whole point of achieving school district
"unitary" status is to restore the very type of local control that was exercise in
37
Louisville and Seattle. 1
Justice Breyer believed that the Louisville and Seattle integration plans
were narrowly tailored for a variety of reasons. First, they used broad racial

132 Id. at 2820.

13See id. at 2820-21.

'34Id. at 2821.
1'See id. at 2821-23.
136 See id. at 2823.
13 Id. at 2823-24.
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ranges-rather than racial quotas-as integration targets. Because the plans
placed the most emphasis on student choice, it was choice rather than race that
was the "predominant factor" driving the plans. Second, the broad racial limits
were less burdensome, and therefore more narrowly tailored, than other uses of
race that the Court had previously approved. They were even more narrowly
tailored than the use of race in Grutter,because the Louisville and Seattle plans
used race in only a small fraction of student assignment cases, and only in a
context that had nothing to do with merit. Third, the plans were developed and
refined over years of consultation and experimentation, in which no less
restrictive alternative had proved adequate. Deference to local school board
expertise and experience in this matter was not inconsistent with strict scrutiny,
but merely recognized the greater institutional competence of local school
boards to resolve such complex issues.
Deference to local school board expertise and experience was also
consistent with the Court's long stand preference for local control.'3 8 The
hypothetical race-conscious but facially-neutral alternatives that Justice
Kennedy identified-including school site selection, gerrymandered attendance
zones, and magnet schools-were either inapplicable under the Louisville and
Seattle circumstances, or had been tried and found to be inadequate. Although
the plurality and Justice Kennedy faulted Louisville and Seattle for their binary
use of only black and white racial categories, a more precise breakdown of
racial groups would have entailed even more use of race, and therefore more
danger of racial divisiveness. 139 Because federal courts found earlier versions
of the Louisville and Seattle integration plans to be constitutional, Justice
Breyer found it difficult to see how the present versions, which gave less weight
to race, could be unconstitutional. 140
Justice Breyer believed that the Framers intended the Constitution to be a
practical document, but he feared that the Roberts plurality opinion would force
Louisville and Seattle to go back to using race neutral plans that had proved
ineffective in the past. In addition, hundreds of other school districts had tried
similar race-conscious techniques for promoting integration and preventing resegregation, and all of those plans were also put in jeopardy by the plurality
opinion. Justice Breyer thought that, at the very least, the Roberts plurality
would spur a surge of race-based litigation.' 4 ' The problem of racial segre-

138 See

id. at 2824-26.

See id. at 2828-29.
'40 See id. at 2830-31.
141 See id. at 2831-33.
"9
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gation was a hard problem to solve, and resegregation was now on the rise.
Justice Breyer believed that race-conscious measures would often be a
necessary resegregation remedy, but thought that Chief Justice Roberts had
deprived local school boards of a vital tool needed to solve the problem.
The plurality-and particularly Justice Thomas, with his commitment to
strict colorblindness-believed that race neutrality was the best way to address
the problem. However, the Constitution does not authorize Supreme Court Justices to dictate solutions to complex social problems. Rather, it allocates that
power to the democratic process. As such, the Constitution bars only invidious
racial discrimination, and not all uses of race-conscious criteria. 142 Justice
Breyer noted that, although the plurality would apparently bar all uses of race,
there remained five Justices who would permit at least some race-conscious
1 43
efforts to "avoid racial isolation" and "achieve a diverse student population."
Justice Breyer argued that the plurality set back the work of local school boards,
ignored stare decisis, and showed a lack of respect for local democratic decisionmaking. Further, it did so in a way that risked the aggravation of racial
conflict. The plurality ignored the fact that Brown was not about eliminating all
race-consciousness, but was about dismantling a racial caste system. Therefore,
the plurality's decision threatened the promise of Brown,
and was "a decision
144
regret."
to
come
will
Nation
the
and
Court
that the
II. DISINTEGRATING EQUALITY

The concept of equality in the United States has been an ever-evolving one.
Although the Declaration of Independence asserted as a self-evident truth "that
all men are created equal," the drafters of that document were comfortable with
a concept of equality that tolerated slavery, the genocide of indigenous Indians,
and the disenfranchisement of women. 145 Accordingly, the Constitution
addressed none of those deficiencies--even after the Bill of Rights was
added. 146 When the Reconstruction Amendments finally abolished slavery and
added the Equal Protection Clause to the Constitution, 147 the Plessy Supreme

142

See id. at 2833-34.

1431 d. at 2835.
144 Id. at 2834-37.

' THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.").
146 See generally U.S. CONST.
147 See id. amends. XIII, XIV.
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48
Court still understood the concept of equality to permit racial segregation.1
When Brown eventually overruled Plessy,149 constitutional toleration of dejure
segregation was
simply replaced by constitutional toleration of de facto
50
segregation.1

That very same defacto segregation is what the Supreme Court chose to
address in the Resegregation case. The Court's willingness to tolerate the
foreseeable school resegregation that will result from its decision demonstrates
that the constitutional concept of equality remains as elastic as ever. At any
point in time, "equality" means whatever the Supreme Court says it means, and
the current Court has reverted to an earlier, more oppressive understanding of
equality. It has reinvigorated a pre-Brown interpretation of the relationship
between segregation and racial equality-and it has strikingly invoked Brown
as its justification for doing so. In the process, Chief Justice Roberts has also
legitimized a contemporary form of racism, in which the concept of equality
itself can be used to sacrifice the interests of racial minorities for the benefit of
disgruntled whites.
A. Overruling Brown
The Louisville and Seattle school districts tried to integrate their public
schools in the belief that doing so was permitted-if not required-by the
reasoning of Brown. Accordingly, it is hard not to wonder whether the
Resegregationcase that invalidated the Louisville and Seattle integration plans
should be understood as overruling Brown as well. Legal precedents are
sufficiently imprecise that the point is necessarily more rhetorical than substantive, but rhetoric often matters most. The Resegregation case can be
viewed as overruling Brown in at least two distinct ways. First, it ignores the
inescapable interest in racialdiversity on which Brown and its progeny seem to

148 See Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding constitutionality
of separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities, by finding that
segregation did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause).
14 9 See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493-95 (overruling Plessy and holding that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
5 'oSee,e.g., Milliken v. Bradley I, 418 U.S. 717,732-36,744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow
inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation, thereby permitting suburban
schools to remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly
minority).
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rest. Second, it protects a form of racial oppression that Brown sought specifically to bring to an end.
1. Diversity
All five Justices in the Resegregation case majority agreed that the
Louisville and Seattle integration plans were not narrowly tailored to advance
the interest in educational diversity that the Supreme Court had held to be
compelling in Grutter.'5 1 The four dissenters vigorously disagreed,1 52 but even
if the majority were correct, any failure to achieve Grutterdiversity would not
be particularly relevant to a claim of constitutionality based on Brown. Grutter
upheld the pursuit of holistic diversity, which Chief Justice Roberts stressed
had encompassed a range of individualized factors deemed educationally
beneficial. 53 And Gratz reinforced that view by invalidating a diversity plan
that the Court believed had paid too much attention to the significance of race
relative to other diversity factors. 154 Brown, however, had nothing to do with
multi-factor holistic diversity. Instead, Brown was limited to single-factor
racialdiversity.
Chief Justice Roberts understood the distinction between holistic and racial
diversity. Characterizing the school boards' argument, he stated:
Each school district argues that educational and broader socialization benefits
flow from a racially diverse learning environment, and each contends that
because the diversity they seek is racial diversity-not the broader diversity at
makes sense to promote that interest directly by relying
issue in Grutter-it
155
on race alone.
But then, with a puzzling doctrinal sleight of hand, Chief Justice Roberts
simply sidestepped the school board argument, stating:
The debate is not one we need to resolve, however, because it is clear that the
racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the
goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from
racial diversity. In design and operation the plans are directed only to racial
Ct. at 2753-54 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
152 See id. at 2800-01; 2824-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151See ParentsInvolved, 127 S.

See id. at 2753-54 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (citing Grutter,539 U.S. at 324-25,
330, 337-38).
l" See id. at 2753-54 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76).
See id. at 2755.
...
'13
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balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned
as illegitimate.156
The problem is that Brown too was about "racial balance, pure and simple,"
in its effort to secure "the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from
racial diversity."
Although Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the Louisville and Seattle
integration plans were not narrowly tailored to advance an interest in Grutter
diversity, he refused even to consider whether the plans were narrowly tailored
to advance an interest in Brown diversity. He acted as if Brown's interest in
racial diversity had somehow been preempted by Grutter, so that Grutter
diversity was now all that remained constitutionally permissible. In that sense,
the Roberts opinion "overruled" Brown by denying its relevance to the very
integration interest on which Brown had rested.
There is a reason for this. As Justice Breyer demonstrated in his dissent,
the Louisville and Seattle plans were very narrowly tailored to minimize the use
of race in preventing resegregation. 157 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a
realistic integration plan could have been any more narrowly tailored. Prior
integration strategies had been tried on multiple occasions in both school districts, and race neutral efforts had failed to produce meaningful integration.
Moreover, when the two districts finally succeeded in achieving a degree of
integration, they relaxed the extent to which they use race as a factor, ultimately
utilizing race even less than the diversity plan upheld in Grutter.118 Chief
Justice Roberts, therefore, had to find some way of making that narrow tailoring irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry he wished to conduct. He accomplished this by labeling the educational interest in integration an interest in
mere "racial balancing," thereby deeming it "patently unconstitutional."' 59 But
such efforts to promote racial integration lie at the core of Brown.
At the time that Brown was decided, Brown could arguably have been
interpreted as requiring only the repeal of official segregation laws, coupled
with prospective race neutrality in student assignments. 16 Such a reading of
Brown would have been similar to the reading that Chief Justice Roberts now
156 See

id.

157
See id. at 2824-30 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
' See id. at 2825-26.
159
See id. at 2753 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion); id. 2755-58; 2763 (Roberts, C.J.,
plurality opinion).
60

1

See

STONE Er AL.,

supra note 7,at 480 (noting that possible reading of Brown requires

only prospective race neutrality).
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wishes to give it. 161 But there are several problems with such a limited reading
of Brown.
First, the Roberts reading is difficult to square with Brown's insistence that
"separate [is] inherently unequal"162-a holding that seems to call for actual
integration as opposed to the mere symbolic repeal of segregation laws. If
racial separation educationally disadvantages minority children and stigmatizes
them as inferior to whites, that disadvantage and stigmatization is unlikely to
dissipate simply because whites have found a way to perpetuate racial segregation in the absence of laws that make such segregation official.
Second, subsequent cases have read Brown as being concerned with actual
integration. Green v. County School Board163 invalidated a race-neutral
"freedom of choice" plan that failed to produce any meaningful integration,
demanding "whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. ' 164 And as
Justice Breyer points out, unanimous Supreme Court dicta in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg expressly stated that a school board "might well
conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole."'' 65 Chief Justice Roberts
treats the Swann dicta as if it occurred in isolation, but it did not. The Swann
dicta was reduced to holding in the companion cases of North CarolinaState
Board of Education v. Swann (where the Court invalidated a prohibition on
166
busing for the purpose of achieving racial balance), and McDanielv. Barresi
plan that was designed
(where the Court upheld a voluntary school assignment
67
to reflect the racial balance of the school district). 1
Third, the effort by Chief Justice Roberts to limit Brown and its progeny to
cases of de jure segregation 168 is logically nonresponsive because it simply

161 See ParentsInvolved, 127

S. Ct. at 2764-68 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (favoring

prospective race neutrality).
162 Brown 1,347 U.S. at 493-95 (holding that "separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.").
163 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
'64 Id. at 437-38.

165 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann v.
Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
166 See id. at 2812 (citing N.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45(1971)).
167 See id. (citing McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971)).
'6 See id. at 2761-64 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (emphasizing distinction between
defacto and de jure segregation).
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assumes the conclusion whose validity is at issue. Brown and the raceconscious integration cases implementing it arose in the context of de jure
segregation, but that does not limit the precedential value of those cases to the
de jure segregation context. Indeed, the precise question at issue in the
Resegregation case is whether the racial balancing efforts that Brown and its
progeny authorized should, for some reason, be limited to the context of dejure
segregation. Rather than address that question, however, Chief Justice Roberts
simply announced his predetermined conclusion.
Customary legal analysis requires some explanation of why an issue was
resolved in a particular manner-not simply an assertion that the issue has been
so resolved. Accordingly, Justice Breyer seems justified in criticizing the
plurality for never explaining "why it would abandon the guidance set forth" in
Swann and the other cases that implemented Brown.169 Once again, however,
there is a reason why Chief Justice Roberts chose to engage in formalist legal
assertion rather than instrumental legal analysis. He chose to do so because it is
hard to find any instrumental justification for limiting Brown to de jure
segregation. All of the reasons for promoting integration in a dejure context
continue to apply in a de facto context as well. And even if one agrees with
cases such as Milliken v. Bradley 1,170 which refuse to impose race-conscious
integration obligations on school districts in the absence of dejure segregation,
there is no reason to deny school districts the ability voluntarily to adopt
integration plans that seek to prevent de facto resegregation. Accordingly,
Justice Breyer stressed:
[t]he opinions cited by the plurality to justify its reliance upon the dejure/de
facto distinction only address what remedial measures a school district may
be constitutionally requiredto undertake .... No case of this Court has ever
relied upon the de jure/defacto distinction
in order to limit what a school
17 1
district is voluntarily allowed to do.
The only serious instrumental justification offered for limiting voluntary
integration efforts to dejure rather than defacto segregation comes from Justice
Kennedy's concurrence. Justice Kennedy argues that the potential divisiveness
of race-conscious integration is too high a price to pay for the benefits of racial

169Id. at 2816 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 See Milliken v. Bradley I, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow

inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation, thereby permitting suburban
schools to remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly
minority).
171See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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diversity. 172 Rational people could agree or disagree with that value judgment,
but one thing seems reasonably clear: There is no platonically correctanswer to
the question of whether the benefits of racial diversity outweigh the costs of
potential white resentment. As a result, it is hard for the Supreme Court to
claim that it has greater institutional competence than the politically accountable school boards have in striking the proper balance between the competing
interests. Justice Breyer points out that the issues surrounding the formulation
of educational diversity plans are extremely complex and subtle, calling for a
considerable amount of expertise and experience. It is, therefore, understandable that he criticizes the Court for dictating its own preferred solution to a
complex social problem in a way that supplants the operation of the democratic
process.173 It would be one thing if the Constitution spoke directly to the issue,
but all the Constitution does is demand "equal protection."' 174 There is no
reason to think that the Supreme Court is in a better position than a local school
board to determine whether non-invidious efforts to prevent resegregation are
required to secure "equal protection." There is, however, a good reason to fear
that the Supreme Court is likely to strike the balance in a way that simply
elevates the interest of whites over the interests of racial minorities. That is
what the Supreme Court has traditionally done in the context of race relations.
2.

Oppression

If Brown stands for anything, it stands for the proposition that the interests
of racial minorities cannot simply be sacrificed in order to advance the interests
of whites. That form of oppression is rooted in the supposed inferiority of
racial minorities, and the supposed superiority of whites. It persisted explicitly
in the United States from the era of slavery, which the Supreme Court upheld in
DredScott,175 through the era of official segregation, which the Court upheld in
Plessy.176 But it was precisely that notion of white-supremacist racial oppres-

172 See

1'

id. at 2795-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

See id. at 2833-34 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ...deny to any person within its

174 U.S. CONST.

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
175 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that
blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of
establishing diversity jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread
of slavery,
as interfering with property rights of slave owners).
176 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding constitutionality
of separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities, by finding that
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sion that the Supreme Court sought to invalidate in Brown, by holding that even
"equal" segregated schools were unconstitutional because of the message of
177
racial caste inferiority that they conveyed.
It is important to remember that the Brown decision was not issued out of
the blue, but rather was a response to the Court's own equality failings. Brown
overruled Plessy-aprior Supreme Court decision in which the Court had sided
with white segregationists against the integration interests of racial minorities.178 And Plessy was simply the latest in a line of earlier Supreme Court
cases that had systematically favored the interests of whites over the interests of
racial minorities. Prior to Plessy, the Court had upheld the institution of slavery
in Dred Scott;179 it had limited the scope of Reconstruction legislation enacted
180
by Congress to protect former black slaves in United States v. Cruikshank;
and it had invalidated other Reconstruction legislation in the Civil Rights
Cases.181 And, of course, the Court's hostility to minority rights did not end
with Plessy. The Court later went on to uphold the now-infamous exclusion
order that led82to the World War II internment of Japanese-American citizens in
Korematsu.1

Even Brown itself turned out to be a major disappointment. It was hoped
that Brown would both desegregate the schools, and end the government's use
of racial classifications. But it did neither. The "all deliberate speed"
limitation that the Court imposed on its desegregation order in Brown II,

segregation did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause).
177 See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 ("To separate [children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
171 See id. at 493-95 (overruling Plessy, and holding that "separate educational facilities
are inherently
unequal.").
179 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407,452 (invalidating congressional limitation on
spread of slavery).
180 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-59 (1875) (refusing to apply
criminal provisions of Enforcement Act of 1870 to Ku Klux Klan lynching of black freedmen);
see also, STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 460-64 (describing Supreme Court restrictions on
Reconstruction legislation).
181See United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883) (invalidating
public accommodations provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875, and imposing "state action"
restriction on congressional antidiscrimination legislation); see also, SToNE ET AL., supranote 7,
at 460-64
(describing Supreme Court restrictions on Reconstruction legislation).
182
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,215-20 (1944) (upholding World War U
exclusion order that led to Japanese-American internment).
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delayed any meaningful Southern desegregation for a decade. 183 And the
Court's refusal in Naim v. Naim to invalidate miscegenation laws permitted
government racial classifications to persist, even though the Court's actions in
Naim were taken the year after it issued its decision in Brown 1. 184 When "all
deliberate speed" finally permitted actual desegregation in the South, the Supreme Court then refused to integrate Northern schools. It chose instead to
adopt its current distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, which
placed Northern schools out of remedial reach because their segregation had resulted primarily from residential housing patterns. 185 More recently, the Court
has used a colorblind conception of Brown to invalidate racial affirmative
action programs and remedial redistricting plans. 186 It is important to remember

183 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (limiting desegregation obligation of public schools to

that which could be accomplished "with all deliberate speed"); see also STONE ET AL., supra
note 7, at 483-88 (describing Supreme Court inaction in face of massive Southern resistance
that followed Brown).
184 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam), and 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per
curiam). In Naim, the United States Supreme Court was asked to hold unconstitutional a
Virginia miscegenation statute that had been upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Virginia decision and remanded for clarification
of the record. 350 U.S. at 891. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, merely reaffirmed its earlier decision and refused to clarify the record. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850
(1956) (per curiam). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to recall or amend
the mandate, finding that the constitutional question had not been "properly presented." This
allowed the Virginia court's decision to remain in effect. 350 U.S. at 985. Because the
neutrality principle that had been announced in Brown I seemed to make the Virginia
miscegenation statute unconstitutional, and because the Supreme Court's failure to resolve Naim
on the merits also seemed to violate a federal statute giving the Supreme Court mandatory
jurisdiction over the case, the Supreme Court's actions in Naim v. Naim have been vigorously
criticized. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues "-A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964) (noting that
"there are very few dismissals similarly indefensible in law."); Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (noting that dismissal of
the miscegenation case was "wholly without basis in the law."). The Supreme Court ultimately
invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statute as a manifestation of white supremacy eleven
years later in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967), when only sixteen states still had
miscegenation statutes on the books. See id. at 6.
185See Milliken v. Bradley I, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow
inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation, thereby permitting suburban
schools to remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly
minority).
186 See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 156-89 (2000) (discussing Supreme Court
affirmative action and redistricting cases).
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that this is the pedigree of the Supreme Court that confronted the Louisville and
Seattle integration plans in the Resegregationcase. And now the Resegregation case shows that the Court is willing to undo even the degree of school
integration that was achieved after so much effort in the fifty-plus years that
have elapsed since Brown.
In the Resegregation case, the Supreme Court chose to give a seat in an
oversubscribed school to a white student rather than a minority student,
knowing that the likely result would be to promote segregation over integration.
The Resegregation case therefore "overruled" Brown's prohibition on racial
oppression, by sacrificing the integration interest of minority school children in
order to advance what turns out to be simply the segregationist interest of white
parents. I am at best a cautious proponent of school integration. 187 But many
racial minorities understandably believe that the only way of ensuring quality
educational opportunities for minority students is by having them attend the
same schools that white students attend. That is because those are the schools
to which the culture has historically allocated the bulk of its quality educational
resources. 188 Since it is often said that "green follows white," 189 integration is
commonly seen as offering the most realistic hope of a better education for
racial minorities. Integration is also said to reduce the stigma that is frequently
imposed on minority students who attend racially isolated schools. In addition,
many believe that integration provides diversity benefits to white and minority

187Some commentators have argued that the racial integrationist strategy that culminated in

Brown did not best serve the educational interests of racial minority children, because racially
identifiable schools with genuinely equal resources might have provided better educational
opportunities for minority students. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v.
BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 20-28 (2004) (favoring
separate but genuinely equal schools for black children); ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR
SEPARATION: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 185-243 (1996) (favoring "limited separation"
in education of black students); cf CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OFBROWNv. BoARD OFEDUcATiON294-303(2004)
(posing question whether separate but genuinely equal education would benefit minority
children more than failed integration efforts); Louis M. Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 673, 717 (1992) (arguing that Brown simply precluded need to provide equal
educational opportunities for minorities); see also Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2777
(Thomas, J., concurring) (disputing claim that quality education for black students has to be
integrated education).
188
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1973)
(describing
dramatic funding discrepancies between minority and white schools).
9
18 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL

JUSTICE 104 (1979) (using phrase to convey common belief that white schools will typically be
better funded than minority schools).
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students alike, as school boards try to prepare those students to live in an
increasingly multicultural society. 190 Notwithstanding those potential benefits,
the Resegregation decision sacrifices the interests of racial minorities in
integrated education for the benefit of white interests that appear to be either
marginal or invidious.
It is important to pinpoint precisely why the plaintiffs in the Resegregation
case might have objected to the race-conscious integration efforts adopted by
the Louisville and Seattle school boards. The most immediate reason appears
to have been the disappointment and inconvenience felt by white parents whose
children were not assigned to the schools that the parents wished their children
to attend. However, it is difficult to see how that injury could amount to a
legally cognizable claim-let alone a claim with sufficient magnitude to
outweigh a school board's interest in integration. The injury is at best
marginal.
The Louisville and Seattle integration plans did not involve magnet
schools, and the school assignments made under those plans had nothing to do
with merit. Accordingly, the integration plans at issue were in no sense
"affirmative action" plans that allocated scarce educational recourses on the
basis of race. As a result, they were not controlled by Grutter,Gratz,or any of
the other restrictive affirmative action cases that the Supreme Court has handed
down in the past two decades. 191 Instead, the Louisville and Seattle plans
entailed what Professor Liu has referred to as a student "sorting" process rather
than a student "selection" process. Students were not selected for particular
schools because of their individual abilities or educational qualifications. They
were given their school assignments simply because students had to be distributed in some way across the district's many schools. 92 That means that there is
nothing special about the disappointment or inconvenience that a student's
parents experienced as a result of the failure to receive a desired school assignment. The very same disappointment and inconvenience would result from
an assignment based on sibling attendance, geographic location, or even

190

See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2820-24 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (describing benefits

of integrated education); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-30 (same).
191 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2818-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
Louisville and Seattle plans from affirmative action programs); see also SPANN, supra note 186,
at 156-63 (discussing historical evolution of Supreme Court affirmative action cases).
192 See Liu, supranote 13, at 281. These considerations caused Court of Appeals Judges
Kozinski and Boudin to favor a more relaxed standard of review for such benign sorting plans.
See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2774 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing views of Judges
Kozinski and Boudin).
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random lottery allocation. Certainly, the disappointment and inconvenience
produced by one of those other sorting criteria would not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Therefore, if there is some constitutional injury
produced by the sorting processes used in the Louisville and Seattle plans, it
must stem solely from the use of race-independent of any attendant
dissatisfaction that would have also accompanied the use of nonracial sorting
criteria. But once one tries to ascertain the nature of a harm that could result
from the use of race simpliciter, one is forced to conclude that more invidious
considerations are at play.
There seems to be no doubt that the Court's decision to invalidate the
Louisville and Seattle integration plans will produce significant school resegregation. 193 Even the Justices who voted to invalidate the plans seem to concede
that resegregation will occur. They simply believe that the danger of
resegregation does not call for the use of race-conscious remedies, because the
resulting resegregation will be defacto rather than de jure in nature.1 94 Even if
one were to accept that view, however, it remains true that the only way white
parents can secure the school assignments they desire is by forcing resegregation on minority students-by placing the white-parent marginal interest in
avoiding disappointment and inconvenience above the interest of minority children in securing an integrated education. Although each individual parent
might view his or her own contribution to school resegregation as insignificant,
the aggregate effect of those individual decisions will, of course, be to erode the
integration gains that Louisville and Seattle have been able to achieve since
Brown. Moreover, the danger of resegregation is not a hidden cost. It is a cost
that has been made quite explicit by the history and prominence of the various
195
Louisville and Seattle integration efforts that have been tried over the years.
The white parents who opposed the Louisville and Seattle racial integration
plans were, therefore, confronted with a clear choice. They could have chosen
to acquiesce in those plans and send their children to racially integrated schools,
or they could have chosen to resist those plans and send their children to
racially resegregated schools. When they elected the latter, and chose to send

193 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 280-02, 2833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (highlighting

danger of defacto resegregation).
'94 See id. at 2751-52, 2761-464 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (emphasizing defacto
nature of any resegregation in Louisville and Seattle); id. at 2768-70 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that renewed racial imbalance would not constitute resegregation, because
"resegregation" has to be de jure rather than defacto in nature).
'9' See id. at 2800-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing history of Louisville and Seattle
integration efforts in context of more general integration efforts).
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their children to resegregated white schools, they were forcing minority
children to attend resegregated minority schools as well. A school system
cannot maintain integrated schools for minority students if white parents
decline to let their children attend those schools. Disappointed white parents,
therefore, were sacrificing the inclusionary educational interests of minority
school children in order to advance exclusionary educational interests of their
own. White parents might be tempted to argue that they have as much right to
send their children to a resegregated school as minority children have to attend
an integrated school. 196 But that is precisely the segregationist argument that
the Supreme Court rejected in Brown. The racially oppressive elevation of
anti-integration white interests over the pro-integration interests of racial minorities-and all of the "inherently unequal" racial stigmatization that such an
97
elevation conveys-violates the core anti-subordination principle of Brown. 1
It allows white parents to send their children to schools that are attended by
other white students, rather than to schools that are attended by racial minorities. And it allows white parents of today to pursue the same degree of racial
separation that white parents of the separate-but-equal generation were able to
pursue before the Supreme Court overruled Plessy in Brown.
Some white parents probably oppose the Louisville and Seattle integration
plans because they consciously do not want their children going to school with
racial minority children. It is difficult to forget that many schools in the United
States have remained starkly segregated even after Brown, and it is unlikely that
the de facto segregation of those schools is the product of mere happenstance. 198 Other white opponents of the Louisville and Seattle integration plans
may be motivated by mere convenience concerns, but they are nevertheless
willing to tolerate school resegregation in order to advance those convenience
concerns. Either way, I suspect that the white parents who oppose the Louisville and Seattle plans do not view themselves as proponents of invidious racial
discrimination. But neither did proponents of the dejure racial segregation that

196 Cf

Wechsler, supra note 185 (asking whether neutral principles permit state to choose

between denying associational preferences of those who desire integration and imposing
association on those who wish to avoid it).
197 See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493-95 (holding that "separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.").
198See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2801-02, 2833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
statistics about present racial segregation in public schools); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 299 n.4
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same); Liu, supra note 13, at 277-78 (same); STONE ET AL., supra
note 7, at 498-99 (same).
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was practiced under the separate-but-equal regime of Plessy. 199 Contemporary
white parents-like their Plessy predecessors-have probably convinced
themselves that they are pursuing a race relations policy that will, in the long
run, reduce racial resentment and promote racial harmony. As dubious or
slanted as such a claim might sound, it is understandable that the disappointed
white parents in Louisville and Seattle would regard their racial preferences as
abstractly benign and constitutionally principled. They are motivated by a selfinterested concern for the welfare of their own children, which gives them a
strong incentive to view their position in as favorable a light as possible. If not
forgivable, the motivation of those objecting parents is at least understandable.
However, it is more difficult to understand why the United States Supreme
Court would take the view that deference to such parental desires is constitutionally compelled. The Court is expected to be more detached than selfinterested parents, and to do a more sophisticated job of parsing pertinent doctrinal principles when it engages in legal analysis. But that appears not to be
the case.
In the Resegregation case, the Supreme Court went out of its way to
recognize a cause of action allowing disappointed white parents to trump the
integration interests of minority school children. And it did so even though the
Court's jurisdiction to entertain the claims of those white parents was
questionable. Although Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the parents
presented ajusticiable controversy, 2°° he did so using doctrinal reasoning that is
difficult to accept. The Constitution requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a
present, redressible injury in order to establish the Article III standing necessary
to have a claim adjudicated in federal court. 201 However, it is not clear that the
claims presented by the Louisville and Seattle parents satisfied this jurisdictional requirement.
The white parent plaintiff in Louisville claimed that her son was denied
assignment to the kindergarten that she wished him to attend, but by its terms,
the Louisville racial assignment plan did not apply to kindergarten assignments.2 °2 It appears that the plan was applied in her son's case simply because

199 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2783-86 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing claims that
segregation under Plessy was racially beneficial).
20 See id. at 2750-51 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (finding jurisdiction).
201See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-CodedStanding, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1422, 1426-31
(1985) (describing law of standing).
202 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749-50 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (stating
facts); id at 2789-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
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of a bureaucratic mix up--something that is not typically viewed as sufficient
to establish the standing needed to challenge the constitutionality of an improperly applied policy.20 3 Moreover, the plaintiff's son has now been trans-

ferred to the desired school, and it is entirely speculative whether he will ever
again be affected by the racial component of the Louisville plan. 20 4 Accordingly, the plaintiff not only appeared to lack standing, but her claim
appeared to be moot as well-thereby providing yet a second reason why the
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction.0 5
Similarly, the members of the plaintiff organization in the Seattle case
either lacked standing, or their injuries were moot. The members who feared
that their children might be denied desired school assignments sometime in the
future did not assert a ripe injury that was adequate for standing. Because
student assignments are determined by many contextual factors that vary from
year to year, those parents could not know whether their desired assignments
would be granted or denied in the future. And even if some future assignments
were denied, the parents could not know if they would have received their
desired assignments in the absence of the racial plan that they opposed. 206 As a
result, those parents could not establish the degree of redressibility that the
Supreme Court has required for Article I jurisdiction. 20 7 The members of the
plaintiff organization who claimed that they had been denied their desired
assignments in the past, had either now received the school transfers that they
desired, or no longer desired the assignments that they had initially requested.2 8
(emphasizing confusion about application of Louisville integration plan to kindergarten
assignments).
203 See id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting
that school board failed to apply its stated policy); Spann, supra note 201, at 1426-31
(discussing lack of Article HI case-or-controversy jurisdiction to resolve speculative or
hypothetical
cases).
2
04 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (noting that
plaintiff's son has now been transferred to desired school).
205 See Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 628-29 n.190
(1983) (discussing law of mootness). The strongest claim that Chief Justice Roberts offers for
jurisdiction is that the plaintiff in the Louisville case had also sought damages. See Parents
Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion). Although a damage claim would
not be mooted by the transfer of the plaintiff's son to the desired school, it is hard to imagine the
Court206recognizing a damage claim that was more than merely nominal.
See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (stating
facts).
207 See Spann, supra note 201, at 1426-31 (discussing redressibility requirement); but see
ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (upholding standing).
208 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (stating
facts).
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With respect to those parents,
therefore, the mootness of their claims again
2 9
0
jurisdiction.
precluded
The law of justiciability is notoriously incoherent. 210 Accordingly, the fact
that the Supreme Court chose to find jurisdiction in a debatable case is not, in
itself, particularly interesting. What is interesting, however, is that the Supreme
Court appears to apply the law of justiciability in ways that are racially
correlated. 21' The Supreme Court has been very demanding in terms of the
injuries that it will view as sufficient to satisfy the Article Ill standing, mootness, and ripeness requirements. That has been particularly true of the stringent
redressibility showing that the Court has demanded for standing. When
minority plaintiffs have sued to challenge alleged racial discrimination in things
like housing, school admissions, or police misconduct, the contemporary Court
has typically found that those minority plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain
their suits, because it was not certain that a favorable ruling would eliminate
their alleged injury.2 12 However, when white plaintiffs have sued to challenge
racial affirmative action programs, the Court has typically upheld their standing
to sue, even if it was not certain that a favorable ruling would eliminate their
alleged injury. For white plaintiffs, the Court has simply relaxed the stringent
redressibility standard that it applies to minority plaintiffs.213
In a very real sense, the law of standing is different for white and minority
plaintiffs. The Court has recognized justiciable injuries for white victims of
alleged discrimination but not for minority victims of alleged discrimination.
And that, of course, is just another form of the white supremacist racial
oppression that Brown sought to prevent. It reflects the Court's belief that
white antidiscrimination interests are simply more important than the antidiscrimination interests of racial minorities. Such a view is unfortunately
consistent with the Supreme Court's prior oppressive history of favoring white
interests over minority interests.214 But it is even more unfortunate that the
Court has insisted on reconfiguring the very concept of equality in a way that

209 See Spann, supra note 205, at 628-29 n.190 (discussing law of mootness); but see

ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (upholding standing
without
210 discussing mootness).
See Spann, supra note 201, at 1426 (noting disarray in law of standing).
211

See id. at 1422-25 (describing color-coded standing thesis).

212 See id. at 1454-58 (describing denial of standing in minority plaintiff cases).
213 See id. at 1459-61 (describing grant of standing in white plaintiff cases).
214
See supra text accompanying notes 178-186 (discussing cases in which Supreme Court
has favored white interests over minority interests).
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makes its participation in racial oppression appear to flow from high principle
and lofty constitutional ideals.
B. Roberts's Racism
I view racism as the practice of exploiting the interests of one race in order
to advance the interests of another. Defined in that way, racism has permeated
United States culture since the beginning. In some of its earliest incarnations,
racism took the form of slavery and then de jure segregation-both of which
rested on an explicit white supremacist belief in the inferiority of racial minorities.21 5 When United States culture evolved to a point where the express
exploitation of minority interests was no longer constitutionally comfortable,
more subtle ways had to be found to reconcile the continuation of white racial
privilege with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. New Supreme
2 16
Court doctrinal devices-such as the invention of a state action requirement,
217
the disregard of de facto segregation, and the limitation of constitutional
protections to cases of intentional discrimination21 ---came to serve the function
of protecting white privilege from incursions by racial minorities.
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has taken it upon itself to protect the white majority from minority advances even when the white majority
itself has authorized those advances in the form of affirmative action or
integration plans. 219 The Court has done this by concluding that such programs
deny the equal protection rights of the white majority, despite the fact that it is
the white majority who has chosen to adopt those plans.22 ° Stated differently,
the white majority decided that it was in its own best interest to reduce the

215 See supra text accompanying notes 175-76 (discussing Supreme Court involvement in
slavery and segregation).
216 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883) (invalidating public accommodations
provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875 and imposing "state action" restriction on congressional
antidiscrimination legislation).
217 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley I, 418 U.S. 717,732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow
inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation, thereby permitting suburban
schools to remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly
minority).
218 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (adopting intent requirement to
establish
equal protection violation).
219
See SPANN, supra note 186, at 156-89 (discussing Supreme Court affirmative action and
redistricting
cases).
220
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,224-26 (1995) (discussing
Supreme Court protection of whites under Equal Protection Clause).
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continuing effects of white privilege in our racially pluralist culture. 221 But the
Supreme Court, nevertheless, told the white majority that the Constitution required white privilege to persist. Therefore, the Supreme Court is now using
the constitutional concept of equality to perpetuate racial discrimination. It
does this by denying the legal relevance of all the advantages that whites were
able to accumulate during their long history as practitioners of racial exploitation. This new form of racism is captured succinctly in the assertion by Chief
Justice Roberts that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race., 222 That blithe exercise in wordplay
reduces to a linguistic adage a social problem so complex that we have been unable to solve it throughout the whole of United States history. This modem
form of Roberts's racism, therefore, constitutionalizesthe existing levels of discrimination in United States culture. It incorporates ongoing white privilege
into a doctrinal baseline to which Chief Justice Roberts is willing to accord constitutional protection indefinitely into the future.
1. Baseline Discrimination
I have argued in the past that the Supreme Court's invalidation of
affirmative action plans has had the effect of freezing the advantages that
whites have impermissibly secured over racial minorities in the distribution of
societal resources. When the Court permits whites to acquire resources through
race-conscious discrimination, but then prohibits minorities from reclaiming a
share of those resources through race-conscious remedies, it is like enacting a
law that prohibits a runner from ever overtaking another runner who has received an illegal head start in a race. The current distribution of societal
resources is simply built into the existing baseline, and the Court reads the
Constitution as prohibiting race-conscious efforts to upset that baseline by
redistributing those resources. 223
What Chief Justice Roberts now adds to this constitutional anomaly is an
insistence that this form of baseline discrimination applies even where there is

221

Professor Bell has argued that whites will only take actions that benefit racial minorities

when it is also in the interest of whites to do so. See Derrick Bell, Brown and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEw PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DEEGREGATION

91-106 (Derrick Bell ed., Teachers College Press 1980).
222 ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
223 See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition209, 47 DuKE L.J. 187, 243-56 (1997) (using
footrace metaphor to illustrate how preexisting inequalities can hide beneath an analytical
baseline).
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no tangible resource being allocated-where the only thing at stake is integration versus resegregation. As has been discussed, the Louisville and Seattle
plans were not affirmative action programs. They were not enacted to override
the allocation of scarce educational resources that would otherwise be distributed to students on the basis of merit. Rather, the sole purpose of the plans was
to promote integration rather than segregation. 2 4 Nevertheless, Chief Justice
Roberts chose to find not only that objecting white parents had a legitimate
interest in sending their children to resegregated schools, but that this interest in
resegregation should be built into the baseline of existing rights that the
Constitution protects from redistribution to racial minorities.
Chief Justice Roberts would seemingly bar all forms of race consciousness
from a school board's efforts to prevent resegregation. He addressed the
facially neutral alternatives that were endorsed by Justice Kennedy-including
race-conscious school siting, gerrymandered attendance zones, and the
establishment of magnet schools-but he did so only to assert that they were
not before the Court. 225 Indeed, it is that very danger of precluding all raceconscious remedies that caused Justice Kennedy to part company with the
Roberts plurality, and to write his own concurring opinion. 2 6 If Justice Breyer
is correct that history has shown race-neutral strategies to be inadequate for
achieving integration, 22227 Chief Justice Roberts has simply read the Constitution
to require resegregation. Moreover, his plurality opinion creates a strong incentive for school districts to stop even trying to integrate their student bodies.
If they try, their efforts are likely to be either ineffective or unconstitutional.
But if they simply stop trying, their actions will be perfectly constitutional. The
likelihood that incurable resegregation will result from the Roberts plurality
opinion is sufficiently foreseeable that the four Justices who signed the opinion
either intended resegregation, or were not troubled by its presence.
Schools might respond to the Roberts prohibition on race consciousness by
using socioeconomic status as a proxy for race. But if schools try using
socioeconomic proxies to promote diversity, they will be acting as if

224

See supra text accompanying notes 191-90 (discussing distinction between affirmative

action and sorting plans).
225 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2766 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (discussing
facially neutral alternatives).
226 See id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(declining to join portions of Roberts's plurality opinion that could be read as precluding all
consideration of race).
227 See id. at 2824-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that history has show need for raceconscious integration strategies).
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socioeconomic factors are all that matter. Notwithstanding the dramatic racial
isolation that continues to exist in many of the nation's schools,22 8 relegating
school boards to the use of socioeconomic proxies conveys the message that
racial segregation no longer poses a distinct social problem. Moreover, the
resegregated schools that racial minorities will be forced to attend are almost
certain to be inferior to the resegregated schools that white students will attend.
White schools traditionally receive better funding and resources than minority
schools, and the Supreme Court has held that such discriminatory funding does
not offend the Constitution. 229 As Professor Seidman has pointed out, Brown
overruled any separate-but-equal requirement that had previously been imposed
by Plessy. Therefore, as long as racially isolated schools are only de facto
segregated, there is no requirement that the white and minority schools be in
any sense equal.23°
Even if school boards do attempt to use socioeconomic status as a diversity
proxy for race, there is still a danger that Chief Justice Roberts will view those
efforts as unconstitutional. In Washington v. Davis, 231 the Supreme Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited intentional discrimination.
Therefore, if a school board's primary motive in using a socioeconomic proxy
for race is to promote defacto racial integration, the Court might well view the
board's actions as entailing the precise type of intentional discrimination that
Washington v. Davis prohibits. Although the Court held in Personnel
Administratorv. Feeney232 that mere knowledge of a policy's disparate impact
was not enough to establish an equal protection violation, the distinction
between Washington v. Davis impermissible actuating intent, and Feeney
permissible in-spite-of intent can be quite elusive.2 33 Because Chief Justice
Roberts seems hostile to the very idea of school integration itself, he might well
conclude that socioeconomic factors serve simply as an impermissible proxy for
race in the resegregation context. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Su-

228
229

See supra note 13 (documenting present school segregation).
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1973)

(upholding
dramatic funding discrepancies between minority and white schools).
230
See Seidman, supra note 187, at 717 (arguing that Brown simply precluded need to
provide equal educational opportunities for minorities).
231 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (adopting intent requirement to
establish equal protection violation).
232 See Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (holding in a
gender discrimination case that mere awareness of known discriminatory effects was not
sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement of the Equal Protection Clause).
233 See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that knowledge of
natural consequences can be most probative evidence of subjective intent).
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preme Court in Missouri v. Jenkins 1234 prohibited the use of facially neutral
magnet schools in an effort to attract white suburban students to the racially
segregated Kansas City schools. The Court viewed the use of magnet schools
as an indirect racially motivated remedy for the type of defacto segregation that
the Court in Milliken 1235 had previously held a school district could not
constitutionally pursue directly.
In his Resegregation concurrence, Justice Thomas cites Lochner for the
proposition that the Constitution does not enact any theory of democratic
education that the Supreme Court, acting as a social engineer, is free to inflict
on the rest of the nation.236 But that is precisely what the Justices who joined
the Roberts plurality opinion appear to be doing. For whatever reason, they
have adopted the view that the Brown-based harms of racial segregation are
outweighed by the need to pursue an abstract interest in colorblind race
neutrality that will prevent many of the nation's schools from ever becoming
integrated. It is difficult to understand why a politically unaccountable
Supreme Court would think it had the institutional competence to inflict that
view on the members of a democratically selected school board that had
reached the opposite conclusion. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court
Justices who adopted such a view had an understanding of equality that is racially discriminatory.
2. DiscriminatingEquality
Almost everyone claims to be in favor of racial equality, but the concept of
equality can be quite tricky to pin down. Things are alike and different in many
ways. One cannot settle on which similarities and differences "count" in
making a particular equality determination without first supplying some
normative objective against which the equality assessment can be measured.237

234

See Missouri v. Jenkins II, 515 U.S. 70, 85- 96 (1995) (prohibiting use of magnet

schools to attract white students from Kansas City suburbs in order to remedy inner-city defacto
segregation).
235 See Milliken v. Bradley I, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow
inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation in Detroit, thereby permitting
suburban schools to remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly minority).
236 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2779 nn.14-15 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
237 Professor Westen has argued that the concept of equality is at bottom an empty vessel,
frequently filled with external meanings that are generally mistaken for the meaning of the
vessel itself. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982)
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This can cause serious problems in zero-sum situations, where the interests of
whites and racial minorities are perceived to diverge in ways that are mutually
exclusive.238 In such situations, it is difficult to determine whether the concept
of equality requires the sacrifice of white interests to advance the interests of
racial minorities, or the sacrifice of racial minority interests to advance the
interests of whites. This determination cannot be made simply by consulting
the principle of "equality" itself. No "plain meaning" of equality can hope to
resolve the underlying conflict in normative preferences that simmers beneath
the surface of a zero-sum dispute. When someone claims that such a dispute
can be resolved through recourse to the plain meaning of equality, he or she is
simply seeking to camouflage a predetermined value judgment that favors one
interest over the other.
The Roberts plurality attributes a plain-meaning, "colorblind" conception
of equality to Brown, and treats that conception as dispositive in resolving the
underlying value conflict that is at issue in the Resegregation case.239 Justice
Thomas places even more emphasis on the dispositive force of "colorblindness"
in his concurrence, and he does so in a way that appears to be a caricature of
doctrinal formalism. 240 However, the suggestion that colorblind race neutrality
could ensure equality simply ignores the centuries of baseline inequalities that
preceded the Court's new commitment to colorblindness. 24' The Justices in the
(equality has no substantive content of its own and derives substance entirely from claims of
rights). The Westen thesis generated spirited responses. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In
Defense of Equality:A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REv. 575,576 (1983) (the equality concept is necessary morally, analytically, and rhetorically); Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality
A Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 600, 603 (1983) (equality has a substantive content of
its own); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1168
(1983) (identifying both formal and substantive principles of equality). For Professor Westen's
reply, see Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals:A Reply,
81 MICH. L. REv. 604, 663 (1983).
238 As stated above, I do not think that the Louisville and Seattle integration plans concern
zero-sum situations, because they are merely sorting programs, rather than merit-based
affirmative action programs. See supra text accompanying notes 191-90. Nevertheless, Chief
Justice Roberts treats the plans as if they inflict some injury on white parents in order to benefit
minority students. See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (finding justiciable injury to
disappointed white parents); but cf supra text accompanying notes 202-15 (arguing that parents
did not
suffer any justiciable injury).
239
See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767-68 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (asserting
that racial classifications are "odious" to concept of equality).
240
See id. at 2782, 2787-88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (applying rigid colorblindness
standard).
241 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing baseline discrimination); see also GIRARDEAU A.
SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY

AMERICA 70-82 (1993) (deconstructing concept of discrimination).
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Roberts plurality are simply using the concept of equality to perpetuate the sacrifice of minority interests for the apparent benefit of whites.
It is very difficult to imagine a non-invidious motive for the Roberts
plurality's resolution of the Resegregation case. It would have been easy for
the Supreme Court to have affirmed the lower court decisions, and to have
invoked the Brown and Swann line of cases to authorize the integration plans
that Louisville and Seattle had voluntarily chosen to adopt. Indeed, it required
a considerable amount of doctrinal maneuvering for the Supreme Court to suppress those precedents, and reject the reasoning of the lower courts that
followed them. 242 I can~ think of only two reasons why the Roberts plurality
might have strained so hard to decide that the Louisville and Seattle integration
plans undermined rather than promoted the concept of equality. The first seems
undemocratic, and the second reeks of racism.
'o

The first reason why the Roberts plurality Justices might have wanted to
invalidate the integration plans at issue in the Resegregation case is that they
viewed the use of any express racial classification as posing a danger of racial
divisiveness so severe that it could not be tolerated, even if it offered the only
realistic hope of preventing resegregation. Although neither the Roberts
plurality nor the Thomas concurrence explicitly invoked the divisiveness argument, Justice Kennedy did articulate such a justification to support his
distaste for the express classification of individuals based on race.243 As I

argued above, however, the politically unaccountable Supreme Court lacks the
institutional competence to substitute its personal value preferences for the
judgments of the politically accountable branches in striking such a delicate
balance between the competing interests. 244 Moreover, given the Supreme
Court's long history of hostility to racial minority interests 245-and the difficulty of finding any meaningful doctrinal constraint on the exercise of the
Court's judicial discretion246--one should be extremely hesitant to cede such
racial policymaking power to the Supreme Court.
The second reason why the Roberts plurality might have wanted to
invalidate the Louisville and Seattle integration plans is that the plurality was

242 See supra Part I.A (discussing ways in which Resegregation case "overruled" Brown).
243
See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2796 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (discussing divisiveness).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 173-74 (analyzing divisiveness justification).
245 See supra text accompanying notes 178-86 (discussing Supreme Court history of
hostility to racial minority interests).
246 See supra Part IH.A (discussing ways in which Resegregationcase "overruled" Brown).
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simply opposed to the idea of racial integration itself. It is as if the Court were
going out of its way to invalidate the Louisville and Seattle plans simply
because those plans would actually produce integration. History has shown that
actual integration is not something to which the Supreme Court has traditionally aspired: the all-deliberate-speed qualification of Brown II produced a
decade of post-Brown I southern segregation; 247 the Court's decision to
distinguish between defacto and dejure segregation precluded any meaningful
northern integration; 248 and the Jenkins H prohibition on efforts to entice white
suburban students back to inner-city schools precluded indirect means of
achieving integration.24 9 In addition, the Court now allows segregated schools
to become unitary after a period of good faith efforts to comply with Brown,
even though the racially identifiable character of those schools has not
changed.25 ° Moreover, the Court refuses to view the resegregation of formerly
segregated schools as something that requires the continued use of
desegregation remedies. 251 Although rampant residential segregation is respon252.
sible for most contemporary school segregation, it is also noteworthy that the
Court has refused to view the subtle forms of state action that contribute to
residential segregation as sufficient to trigger the integration remedies that the
253
Court makes available for de jure discrimination. 25 And, of course, the

247

See Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301 (limiting desegregation obligation of public schools to

that which could be accomplished "with all deliberate speed"); see also STONE ET AL., supra
note 7, at 483-88 (describing Supreme Court inaction in face of massive Southern resistance
that followed Brown).
248 See Milliken v. Bradley I, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow
inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation, thereby permitting suburban
schools to remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly
minority).
249 See Missouri v. Jenkins II, 515 U.S. 70, 91-96 (1995) (prohibiting use of magnet
schools to attract white students from Kansas City suburbs in order to remedy inner-city defacto
segregation).
250
See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246-51 (1991) (even
racially identifiable schools become unitary after period of good faith compliance with
desegregation decree).
251 See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 431-40 (1976) (no need to
of resegregation through population shifts).
take account
252
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
253 See Spangler, 427 U.S. at 431-37 (state involvement in "white flight" exacerbating
residential segregation not a basis for integration remedies); see also ParentsInvolved, 127 S.
Ct. at 2775-76 (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting claim that past school segregation affected
housing segregation); cf. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 224-36 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (offering argument rejected by majority that state
involvement in defacto segregation make defactolde jure distinction untenable).
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Resegregationcase itself prohibits voluntary race-conscious efforts to promote
integration, even when those efforts seem necessary to prevent resegregation. 254
For some reason, the Supreme Court simply seems averse to the idea of actual
integration, and the concept of equality to which the Court subscribes is
expansive enough to embrace that aversion.2 55 The Plessy Supreme Court had
an understanding of equality that permitted the maintenance of racial
segregation, and the Roberts Supreme Court seems intent on reviving that
understanding.
I cannot help but feel that the Roberts Court went out of its way in the
Resegregation case to solve a problem that did not exist-much as the
Rehnquist Court did in Shaw v. Reno,256 when it recognized a cause of action
enabling disgruntled whites to challenge race-conscious redistricting. In both
cases, the white plaintiffs suffered no concrete injury other than minor
disappointment or inconvenience, and in both cases the real motive for the
plaintiff's legal challenge seems to have been an objection to association with
racial minorities. In the Resegregationcase, the stated injury was the inability
to go to the school of one's choice, and in the Redistricting case, the stated
injury was the inability to vote in the district of one's choice. But all of the
pertinent schools were formally "equal" in the Resegregationcase, just as all of
the voting districts were formally "equal" in the Redistrictingcase. As a result,
the disappointment suffered from the failure to secure the desired voting- or
school-district assignment was legally no more cognizable than the disappointment suffered from a geographic- or lottery-based assignment.2 57 Both
the Resegregationand Redistrictingcases, however, involved a real injury that
remained tacit, because it was too inconsistent with the culture's stated values
to be made explicit. In the Resegregation case, the real injury was that a student would have to go to school with racial minority students in an integrated
school; in the Redistrictingcase, the real injury was that a voter would have to
vote in a majority-minority district with racial minority voters. In both cases,
the white interest in avoiding unwanted association with racial minorities is

254 See

ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that race-

conscious remedies invalidated by Court may be necessary to prevent resegregation).
255 For a more extensive discussion of the Supreme Court's school desegregation cases, and
how they illustrate the Court's conception of equality, see SPANN, supra note 241, at 70-82.
256 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (recognizing cause of action to challenge raceconscious redistricting).
27 See supra text accompanying notes 191-92 (discussing lack of legally cognizable
injury).
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what was at stake, and in both cases, there was no way to recognize that injury
without giving deference to white racial preferences.
In the line of Redistricting cases that was spawned by Shaw v. Reno, the
Supreme Court was ultimately unable to sustain a coherent cause of action for
disappointed white voters, and the Court seems now to have withdrawn from
the business of policing race-conscious redistricting. It has done so through the
expedient of permitting the use of race as a proxy for political affiliation, because the task of distinguishing coherently between acceptable and unacceptable uses of race apparently proved too daunting.2 58 One might hope that
the Court would have learned a lesson from its redistricting experience, but the
Resegregation Supreme Court chose instead to replicate its Shaw v. Reno
mistake by permitting disappointed white parents to challenge school board
efforts to promote integration. In both the Resegregation and Redistricting
contexts, the Supreme Court was confronted with the same insoluble problem.
The Court was trying to advance a race-neutral agenda, that was rooted in the
claim that race does not matter. However, it was trying to do so in a culture
that has always been based on the core conviction-whether stated or
unstated-that race really does matter a lot. The Supreme Court's continuing
mission, therefore, has been to permit the culture's racial dynamics to play out
as it seems they inevitably must, but to make their operation appear consistent
with the idea of racial equality.
In 1948, the southern Dixiecrats opposed federal civil rights laws, for the
stated reason that federal intervention was inconsistent with states rights. No
one, of course, believed them, and now the "states rights" movement of the
period has become code for the Southern segregationist policies that were
rooted in invidious discrimination against blacks. 259 The Roberts Supreme
Court's use of "equality" to promote segregation is similarly invidious. In
retrospect, I suspect that it too will come to be recognized as mere code for the
contemporary segregationist policies favored by current social conservatives. I
can only hope that this recognition will occur sooner rather than later, so the

258 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001) (permitting use of race in
redistricting as proxy for political affiliation). Note that Professor Liu has invited the Court to
apply its redistricting jurisprudence in the school resegregation context. See Liu, supra note 13,
at 306-07 (arguing that integration plans should be upheld unless race has been the
"predominant factor" in formulating the plan).
259 See Wikipedia, Dixiecrat, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dixiecrat (last visited Dec. 5,
2007); Scott Buchanan, Dixiecrats,
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h=1366 (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
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Supreme Court will stop practicing racial discrimination through the technique
of judicial review.
III. DISINTEGRATING JUDICIAL REVIEW

Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, "The American people are infected with
racism-that is the peril. .

.

.Paradoxically, they are also infected with

democratic ideals-that is the hope.,, 260 A primary function of the Supreme
Court has been to utilize the power of judicial review to mediate the tension
that exists between that racism and those democratic ideals. The Court's job
has often been to mask the symptoms of American racism, so that they appear
to flow from the democratic ideal of racial equality. I have argued in the past
that this "veiled majoritarian" form of judicial review serves the function of
26
promoting majoritarian interests at the expense of racial minority interests. 1
That is not a good thing. But it is something that is likely to persist as long as
the dominant culture continues to desire the sacrifice of racial minority interests
for white majoritarian gain. What cases like the Resegregation case reveal,
however, is that the Court sometimes oppresses racial minorities even when the
white majority would prefer not to---even when protecting minority interests in
our racially pluralist culture coincides with the interest of the white majority.262
And that is a form of judicial review that the white majority might refuse to tolerate, once it realizes what is going on. When majoritarian preferences are
denied because the Constitution compels such denials, the majority is likely to
acquiesce in Supreme Court invalidations. But if majoritarian preferences are
being denied in the name of constitutional compulsion, but are really being
overridden by the Supreme Court's own racial policy preferences, the majority
may cease to acquiesce. Hopefully the political-as opposed to doctrinal-nature of the Supreme Court's Resegregationdecision is sufficiently transparent
that it will help to prompt such a majoritarian realization, and will thereby
undermine popular support for racially oppressive judicial review.

260 See TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN's EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965-1968
746 (2006) (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.).
261 See SPANN, supra note 241, at 1-6 (describing "veiled majoritarian" judicial review).
262 Professor Bell's interest-convergence model predicts that this is the only time that the

white majority will protect the interests of racial minorities. See Bell, supra note 221, at 91-106
(describing interest-convergence model).
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Racial Politics

The Resegregationdecision seems political rather than doctrinal in nature.
The Justices who joined the majority are, of course, politically conservative on
the issue of race. Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the majority and
plurality opinions, 263 was recently appointed by President George W. Bush to
replace the late Chief Justice Rehnquist. He was appointed largely because of
his politically conservative views, including his views on race. 264 The Resegregation case was the first major race case on which Roberts sat as a Supreme
Court Justice, but he did vote against racial minority interests in a prior
Supreme Court redistricting case. 265 The remaining four Justices in the
Resegregation majority were Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito.266
Like Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito is a new member of the Court,
appointed by George W. Bush largely because of his conservative political
views. 267 The Resegregation case was also his first major race case as a
Supreme Court Justice, but he too voted against racial minority interests in a
268
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
prior Supreme Court redistricting case.
Thomas all have long and consistent histories of opposition to racial minority
interests, and none of the three has ever voted in favor of racial minority
interests in any Supreme Court affirmative action or majority-minority

263 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746 (Roberts, C.J., majority and plurality
opinions).
264 See Joan Biskupic, Few Big Rulings as Justices Felt Out New Roles: Addition of Two
Members,Rising Influence of a Third Left Court in Caution Mode, USA TODAY, June 30,2006,
at 9A (discussing political leanings of new Supreme Court Justices).
265 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito previously voted to reject black and Latino vote
dilution claims in a recent Texas redistricting case. After Grutter was decided, the Supreme
Court invalidated 5-4, under the Voting Rights Act, a mid-decade Texas redistricting plan that
eliminated a majority-Latino voting district. See League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2612-23 (2006) (upholding Latino vote dilution claim). Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justice Alito voted to reject this claim. See id. at 2652-63 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting in part, with Alito, J.). Justices Scalia and Thomas also voted to reject this claim.
See id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part, with Thomas, J.). In addition, a majority of the
Court rejected a Voting Rights Act claim asserting dilution of black voting strength). See id. at
2624-26 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J., with Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J.); id. at 2652
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, with Alito, J.); id. at 2663-68 (Scalia, J., concurring in
in part, with Roberts, C.J., Thomas, and Alito, JJ.).
judgment
266
See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (listing
who joined majority).
Justices
267
See Biskupic, supra note 264, at 9A (discussing political leanings of new Supreme
Court Justices).
268 See supra note 265.
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redistricting case. 2 69 Because Roberts and Alito joined those three Justices in
voting to invalidate the integration plans at issue in the Resegregationcase, it
remains true that no Justice in the Resegregationmajority has ever voted in favor of a racial minority interest in an affirmative action, redistricting, or integra2
tion case. 270
0 One can never be certain, but it is hard not to imagine that the Justices in the Resegregation majority would also have voted with the majorities in
cases like Dred Scott,27 1 Plessy272 and Korematsu.273 The apparently political
nature of the Court's Resegregationdecision is also supported by the circumstances under which the Court granted certiorari,and by the Court's disregard
of stare decisis in refusing to follow Brown.
1. Certiorari
It is surprising that the Supreme Court decided to grant certiorariin the
Resegregationcase. After decades of contentious doctrinal turmoil, 274 the law
of affirmative action had finally reached a state of equilibrium under the
companion cases of Grutter275 and Gratz276 -where racial affirmative action
was disfavored, but permitted in certain narrowly tailored circumstances to
promote student diversity. Similarly, after nearly a decade of equally contentious doctrinal turmoil, the law of majority-minority redistricting reached a state

269 See SPANN, supra note 186, at 159-63 (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs and
voting records on affirmative action and redistricting). Since the statistics in that book were
published, Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas have also voted against racial minority interests
in the Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310, and Gratz, 539 U.S. at 247, affirmative action cases, as well as
in the270
Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2602-04, redistricting case. See supra note 265.
See supra note 265.
271 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that

blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of
establishing diversity jurisdiction & invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of
slavery,
as interfering with property rights of slave owners).
272
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding constitutionality
of separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities, by finding that
segregation did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause).
273 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,215-20 (1944) (upholding World Warl
exclusion
order that led to Japanese-American internment).
274
See SPANN, supra note 186, at 10-84 (describing contentious history of Supreme Court
affirmative action cases).
211 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (holding that the race conscious pursuit of
educational
diversity constituted a compelling governmental interest).
276 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251 (invalidating an affirmative action diversity plan as not
narrowly tailored).
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of equilibrium in Easley v. Cromartie277-where the "predominant" use of race
in redistricting was prohibited, but race could be used as a proxy for political
affiliation. Because it had proved so difficult for the Court to reach such a state
of equilibrium in the affirmative action and redistricting contexts, and because
the cases establishing the new equilibrium were so recent, it is not clear why the
Court would want to destabilize matters in the comparatively innocuous context
of voluntary race-conscious efforts to prevent resegregation. Indeed, six
months prior to granting certiorari in the Resegregation case, the Supreme
Court had denied certiorari in Comfort v. Lynn School Committee278 a
strikingly similar case, raising the same race-conscious de facto integration
issue. In Comfort, the District Court and the en banc Court of Appeals had
upheld the integration plan at issue on the basis of the diversity rationale of
Grutter-just as the lower 279courts had done in the two consolidated
Resegregationcase decisions.
The change that occurred between the time that the Court denied certiorari
in Comfort, and the time that the Court granted certiorariin the Resegregation
case, was not a change in controlling constitutional doctrine. It was a change in
Supreme Court personnel. Certiorariwas denied in Comfort on December 5,
2005, when Justice O'Connor-the author of Grutter-was still on the
Court.280 However, the membership of the Supreme Court was reconfigured in
June 2006, when Chief Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Alito replaced Justice O'Connor. 281 Although there was no Circuit split
on the issue of whether Grutterdiversity permitted the types of defacto integration plans at issue in Comfort and the Resegregationcase, the Supreme Court
nevertheless granted certiorariin the Resegregationcase. The racial politics of
the Court had simply changed, and the substitution of Justice Alito for Justice
O'Connor meant that there were no longer five Justices who supported the
application of Grutter diversity to voluntary de facto integration.28 2 The

277

532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001) (permitting use of race in redistricting as proxy for

political affiliation).
278 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1061 (2005) (upholding
Massachusetts school integration plan).
279 Compare Comfort, 418 F.3d at 5-10 (upholding plan) with ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct.
at 2746-50 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (describing lower court decisions).
280 See Comfort, 546 U.S. at 1061 (denying certiorarion Dec. 5, 2005).
281 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use ofRace In IntegrationPlans,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at AI (discussing political change in Court membership); see also
Biskupic, supra note 264, at 9A (discussing political leanings of new Supreme Court Justices).
282 See Greenhouse, supra note 281, at Al; see also Biskupic, supra note 264, at 9A.
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granting of certiorariin the Resegregationcase was not about doctrine. It was
about Supreme Court racial politics. And so was the outcome of the case.
2.

Stare Decisis

The doctrine of stare decisis is the thing that is supposed to insulate judicial
decisionmaking from the political preferences of the judges who issue judicial
decisions. The need to follow precedent is said to constrain the discretion of
judges, so that they cannot give full vent to their political biases and
predispositions in deciding the cases that they are asked to resolve.283 It seems
pretty clear that the Brown precedent was about desegregating schools, and not
about resegregating them.284 As the Resegregation dissent forcefully points
out, under any non-tortured interpretation of Brown and its progeny, stare
decisis would permit rather than prohibit voluntary efforts to promote
integration and prevent resegregation. Brown was about eliminating the
nation's "inherently unequal" segregated schools, and the Swann line of cases
authorized the use of race-conscious remedies to prevent that inherent
inequality. 285 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts chose not to adhere to this
common understanding of Brown.
After a series of make-weight arguments,286 the primary claim offered by
Chief Justice Roberts to distinguish the Brown line of cases from the
Resegregationcase is that Brown concerned de jure segregation, and the type
of segregation at issue in the Resegregation case was merely de facto in nature.287 That claim rests upon a distinction between public and private action
288
that has been thoroughly destabilized by decades of critical legal scholarship.
It has now become child's play to manipulate the state action doctrine in order
to justify a wide range of desired discretionary results.289 Justice Breyer's

283 See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably ErroneousPrecedents, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1, 4-52, 83-84 (2001) (discussing stare decisis as constraint on judicial discretion); see
generallyLawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court In Bondage: ConstitutionalStare Decisis,
Legal Formalism,and the Future of UnenumeratedRights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155 (2006)
(discussing role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication).
284 See supra Part II.A (arguing that the Resegregationcase "overruled" Brown).
285 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811-20; 2835-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186 See id. at 2816-20 (discussing counterarguments offered by Chief Justice Roberts).
287 See id. at 2751-52, 2761-64 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).
288 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982) (discussing incoherence of public/private distinction).
289 See, e.g., SPANN, supra note 241, at 41-50 (illustrating degree of discretionary play
inherent in distinction between state and private action).
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dissent emphasizes the artificiality of the distinction between de facto and de
jure discrimination by noting that the difference between the two can turn on
nothing more significant than whether a discrimination claim is or is not settled
prior to final adjudication-a distinction that is, in fact, reflected in the
respective histories of the Seattle and Louisville integration plans themselves. 29 0
It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberts chose to rest an issue as grave as the
future integration or segregation of the nation's schools on a doctrinal distinction that was this tenuous. However, that tenuous doctrinal distinction did
have a certain instrumental value.
The doctrinal play that exists in the distinction between defacto and dejure
discrimination does not simply permit political considerations to enter into a
stare decisis analysis of Brown. It requires recourse to such political policy
preferences in order to give the distinction any operative meaning at all. Like
the concept of equality, 291 the de facto versus de jure distinction provides an
open invitation for the Court to infuse its own racial policy preferences into its
adjudications. And Chief Justice Roberts elected to place dispositive weight on
that distinction in order to take advantage of that invitation. The Supreme
Court's resolution of the Resegregationcase was, therefore, political rather than
doctrinal, because it could not have been anything else.
B. The Emperor'sNew Clothes
In the Hans Christian Anderson fairy tale The Emperor's New Clothes,
adults are tricked, through appeals to their vanity and self-interest, into
pretending to see and admire a magnificent new suit of clothes that is
supposedly worn by their Emperor. Eventually, a puzzled child-too young
and innocent to appreciate the importance of collective pretense-announces
that the Emperor is in fact wearing no clothes at all. It is only then that the
adults publicly admit to each other what they privately have known to be true
all along.292
In a sense, everyone privately knows that Supreme Court judicial review in
race cases rests on the unstated racial policy preferences of the Justices.
Nevertheless, we publicly pretend that Supreme Court adjudication is guided by

290

See supra text accompanying notes 106-07 (discussing artificiality of distinction

between defacto and de jure discrimination).
291 See supra text accompanying notes 237-38 (discussing imprecise meaning of equality).
292 See Wikipedia, The Emperor's New Clothes, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
The.emperor%27s newclothes (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
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doctrinal principles rather than by political ideology. What we need is for
someone to break this spell of collective pretense by announcing that,
doctrinally speaking, the Justices are wearing no clothes to conceal their normative preferences. It is my hope that the politics underlying the Supreme
Court's Resegregationdecision is so transparent that the case will itself constitute such an announcement, and that the decision will begin to eroded the
legitimacy of judicial review.
Perhaps, the most insulting aspect of the Roberts opinion in the Resegregation case is its insistence on pretending that the outcome it reaches is
29
compelled by Brown.293
That is what seems to have incensed the dissenters, 294
295
and many commentators have condemned the Court's departure from Brown.296
The reason I tried to characterize the Resegregationcase as overruling Brown
was precisely to increase public skepticism about the Resegregationdecision.
Rightly or wrongly, Brown has come to be revered by the culture at large. As a
result, transparent Supreme Court exploitation of Brown for parochial political
purposes may exceed public tolerance for Supreme Court policymaking in the
guise of judicial review. If the young and innocent child in The Emperor's
New Clothes were able to read the Resegregationopinion authored by Chief
Justice Roberts, I think the child would conclude that the opinion and the
Emperor were similarly attired.
1. Loss of Legitimacy
The Roberts Court purports to be a conservative, incrementalist Court that
is opposed to judicial activism. 297 Accordingly, when such a Court re-

293

See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767-68 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (arguing

that result is compelled by Brown).
294 See id. at 2797-2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to reliance on Brown); id. at
2800-01, 2834-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
295 See Editorial:RaceMatters, ST. LOuiS POST-DISPATCH, July 2, 2007, at B8 (criticizing
Supreme Court for not following Brown); Editorial:ResegregationNow, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2007, at A28 (same); Dana Slagle, Blacks View High Court's Vote to End Race-Based
Integration PlansAs A Step Backward, JET, July 16, 2007, at 4 (same).

296 See supra Part II.A (arguing that the Resegregation case overrules Brown).
297 See Vikram Amar, The Roberts Hearings:Blah andMore Blah: Lack ofAnswers from

Likely ChiefJustice Equals Lack of Drama-AndThat's a Problem, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWs,

Sept 18, 2005, at 1 (suggesting that Roberts may be conservative incrementalist); Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Roberts'PhilosophyLikely to MirrorRehnquist's,SUNDAY GAzETrE & DAILY MAIL,
Sept. 11, 2005, at 17A (same); Jeffrey Rosen, In Search of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2007, at A29 (same); see also Donna Cassata, Experts View Alito as Incrementalist,Not a
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institutionalizes school segregation in one fell swoop, it seems fair to ask
whether the opinion authorizing that re-institutionalization makes any sense.
The Roberts Resegregation opinion is highly formalist in its non-instrumental
insistence on colorblind race neutrality. 298 But the opinion ultimately rests on a
litany of prior doctrinal ipsi dixits that are themselves as insubstantial as the
Emperor new clothes.
Nicholas Lehman argued in The New Yorker that no version of original
intent supports the theory of colorblindness that Chief Justice Roberts attempted to invoke in his Resegregation opinion. 299 In the past, the Equal
Protection Clause has been viewed as consistent with both dejure segregation
and with race-conscious affirmative action. "But, as a mater of history,"
Lehman stresses, "the idea that the amendment was meant to make the country
'color-blind' is wrong, and wrong in a way that is instructive for people
thinking about American race relations today. '' 300 I find the Lehman observation to be encouraging, because it comes from a non-lawyer, and because it is
published in a highly regarded, non-legal publication. If legal experts find it
possible to reason their way to the result produced by the Resegregationcase,
then the future of the nation's racial progress may end up better nurtured in the
hands of non-lawyers.
The ahistorical formalism of the Roberts opinion does not offer any actual
reasons for invalidating the Louisville and Seattle integration plans. Indeed,
Justice Breyer rebukes Chief Justice Roberts for precisely this deficiency.3 ° 1
Rather, Chief Justice Roberts merely relies on a standard litany of assertions,
derived from prior affirmative action cases, that were never themselves supported by adequate instrumental justifications. He argues that the applicable
level of constitutional scrutiny does not distinguish between benign and invidious uses of race; 30 2 that the Constitution does not permit remedies for general
"societal discrimination;, 30 3 and that the Constitution prohibits efforts to
Radical,CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at A9 (suggesting that Alito, like Roberts, will be
conservative incrementalist).
298 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (favoring
colorblindness).
299 See Nicholas Lehman, Comment: Reversals, THE NEW
3
00 Id.
301 See

YORKER, July 30, 2007,

at 27.

ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2816 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chief

Justice Roberts does not explain why he is abandoning Swann integration principle).
302 See id. at 2764-68 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to benign
and invidious racial classifications); see also id. at 2774-75 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).
303 See id. at 2758-59 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (rejecting remedies for societal
discrimination); see also id. at 2772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same); id. at 2795 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (same).
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achieve racial balance.3 °4 I have in the past argued that there are serious
doctrinal difficulties with each of those assertions. 30 5 However, for present
purposes, the important point is that all of the assertions also lack intuitive
appeal.
It seems obvious that the difference between benign and invidious uses of
race is quite significant, given the history of race relations in the United States.
There are important differences between efforts to promote slavery or
segregation on the one hand, and to promote affirmative action or integration on
the other. And a Supreme Court holding that insists on the doctrinal irrelevance of this commonsense distinction cannot hope to have much intuitive appeal. Similarly, the notion that the Constitution precludes race-conscious efforts to remedy the subtle forms of societal discrimination that pervade most
aspects of contemporary culture, seems equally indefensible. Because such
societal discrimination perpetuates tacit beliefs in racial caste inferiority, and
promotes unthinking racial oppression through inertia, one would intuitively
think that general societal discrimination is precisely the sort of discrimination
to which the Equal Protection Clause would apply with the greatest force.
Finally, the suggestion that remedial efforts to promote racial balance are unconstitutional seems simply perverse. In a nondiscriminatory culture, one
would expect societal resources to be distributed in a racially proportional
manner. Therefore, efforts to replicate the results that would be produced by a
nondiscriminatory culture hardly seem to merit Supreme Court condemnation
as a form of unconstitutional discrimination.
In addition to invoking the standard litany of arguments for resisting efforts
to promote racial equality, Chief Justice Roberts also rejects two other
distinctions offered by the Resegregationdissenters that seem to have palpable
appeal. First, Justices Stevens and Breyer argue that there is an important
distinction between race-conscious efforts that seek to include, and race
conscious efforts that seek to exclude, racial minorities.3 °6 But the Roberts
plurality opinion rejects the importance of that distinction, relying simply on a

'04 See id. at 2755, 2758-59 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (rejecting racial balancing);
see also id. at 2769-70 nn.2-3, 2773 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).

305 See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action andDiscrimination,39 HOWARD L.J.

1, 63-90 (discussing benign and invidious discrimination); Girardeau A. Spann, The DarkSide
of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENTARY 221, 231-36 (discussing societal discrimination); id. at

239-42 (discussing racial balancing).
306 See ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2798 n.3 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (distinguishing
between inclusion and exclusion of racial minorities); id. at 2815, 2817-18, 2834-35 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (same).
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series of prior cases in which the difference between benign an invidious
discrimination was rejected.3 °7 Second, Justice Breyer argues that schools can
take voluntary integration actions, even when they could not be compelled by a
court to take those actions, because there is an important difference between
what is required and what is pennitted by the Constitution. 30 8 Chief Justice
Roberts also rejects the importance of that distinction, offering a variety of
technical arguments relating to the de facto versus de jure divide; the legal
3 9
force of dicta; and the irrelevance of benign or invidious motivation. 0
The harm of adopting a jurisprudence that will result in the resegregation of
public schools is obviously quite high. But the harm that Chief Justice Roberts
claims to be preventing in return is quite small. That harm is simply the danger
that people will come to understand that they live in a culture that does not
allocate resources in a race-neutral manner. Far from being a harm, I would
deem it an affirmative good for people to come to understand that they live in a
culture whose ideal of colorblind race neutrality is not being realized in
practice. It is also an affirmative good for people to realize that the best way of
pursuing the ideal of racial equality is through the present use of race conscious
remedies. In Adarand, the danger that the Supreme Court invoked in evaluating an affirmative action set aside for minority construction contractors was
noticeably small. The only thing that ended up posing constitutional difficulties
was a rebuttable presumption, contained in two federal statutes, stating that
racial minorities were economically and socially disadvantaged.3 10 Most people
would view such a presumption-rebuttablein atypical cases-as descriptively
undeniable. But the Adarand Supreme Court found that the presumption was
subject to nearly-always-fatal strict scrutiny.311 The Resegregation Court's

307 See id. at 2764-65 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (rejecting distinction between

minority inclusion and exclusion).
308 See id. at 2812, 2823-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between what is
required and what is permitted).
309 See id. at 2816 (discussing responses of Justice Roberts to distinction between what is
required
and what is permitted).
310
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 205-10 (1995) (describing
presumption).
311 See id. at 226-27 (applying strict scrutiny). The only two cases in which a racial
classification has survived strict equal protection scrutiny are the now-discredited World War I
Japanese-American exclusion case of Korematsuv. UnitedStates, 323 U.S. 314, 215-20 (1944)
(upholding World War H exclusion order that led to Japanese-American internment), and the
recent affirmative action case of Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (upholding
Michigan Law School affirmative action plan as a narrowly tailored means of advancing
compelling interest in student diversity).
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invalidation of the Louisville and Seattle integration plans seems similarly
strained and artificial in its suggestion that the dangers of race-conscious
integration are so great that they require us to endure the resegregation of the
nation's schools.
I am hoping that the underlying intuitive appeal of the arguments that Chief
Justice Roberts rejects, combined with the intuitive dissatisfaction that is likely
to accompany his way of balancing the competing interests, will be strong. I
am hoping that it will be sufficiently strong that members of the general public
will opt to follow their own intuitions, rather than the Chief Justice's more
esoteric foray into doctrinal analysis. Consistent with the phenomenon illustrated by the Emperor's New Clothes, my goal is to get people to admit what
they already know to be true. Chief Justice Roberts believes that "the way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race. 3 12 He favors colorblind race neutrality, but it is the same form of colorblind race neutrality that Justice Harlan taught us in his Plessy dissent is
inevitably linked to white supremacy.3 13
2. ResegregatingDemocracy
If the Supreme Court is intent on reinstituting segregation, I have a form of
segregation that it would be helpful for the Court to revive. The Court could
beneficially resegregate democratic policymaking from countermajoritarian
adjudication. I have never been a big believer in the distinction between law
and politics. But the conventional legitimacy of judicial review depends upon
the coherence of that distinction. Since most members of the Supreme Courtand perhaps most members of the general public-do believe that the distinction is a meaningful one, the Supreme Court should try its best to honor that
distinction, and to stay on the adjudicatory side of the line. Supreme Court
nominees ritualistically promise during their confirmation hearings that they

ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
id. at 2758 (citing the "Our Constitution is color-blind" language of Plessy, 163
U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J.,dissenting)). In addition to announcing that the Constitution is
colorblind, Justice Harlan's Plessydissent also explicitly endorsed a belief in white supremacy.
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (asserting that the white race was "the dominant race in this
country... in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not,
it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage ....).
312

113 See
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will apply the law rather than make it.314 Accordingly, it does not seem unfair
to ask that they refrain from violating the separation of legislative and judicial
powers, at least where the violations are particularly egregious.
Wherever the line may lie between legislative and judicial power, the raw
political policymaking that was entailed in the majority's resolution of the
Resegregation case seem plainly to fall on the policymaking side of the line.
There is no credible argument that either the text or the original intent of the
Constitution requires the Supreme Court to invalidate integration programs that
are voluntarily adopted by politically accountable, white majoritarian, government policymaking officials. And as a matter of relative institutional
competence, there is simply no reason whatsoever to believe that an institution
with the racial track record of the Supreme Court is better able than a legislature or school board to decide whether primary and secondary school
integration is in the best interests of a pluralistic, multicultural society. As
cases from Dred Scot? 15 to Lochner316 illustrate, the Supreme Court has historically been an impediment to social progress. Perhaps, having a conservative institution that retards a culture's evolution beyond the statusquo is a good thing
to have. I am skeptical. But even if I am wrong about this, it does not seem too
much to ask that such an institution confine its socially regressive efforts to
matters that are at least arguably within the scope of its institutional
competence.
CONCLUSION

1,317

In ParentsInvolved In Community Schools v. Seattle School DistrictNo.
a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court decided that it was better to

disintegrate the public schools than to allow race-conscious efforts to prevent
resegregation. By allowing the cultural forces of passive resegregation to trump

314 See

Mark V. Tushnet, Following The Rules Laid Down: A Critique ofInterpretivism

and Neutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 781-82 (1983) (describing federal judge
confirmation ritual).
315 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that blacks
could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of
establishing diversity jurisdiction & invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of
slavery,
as interfering with property rights of slave owners).
316
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905) (invalidating as due process violation
New York maximum hours health and safety legislation for bakers).
317 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (invalidating race-conscious efforts to prevent resegregation of
public schools in consolidated cases involving the Seattle, Washington and Louisville/Jefferson
County, Kentucky school systems).
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school board efforts to promote integration, the Court ended up
constitutionalizing defacto racial segregation. Because the case was decided in
a context where the conscious consideration of race appears to provide the only
way of preventing resegregation, the Court was willing to overrule Brown's
commitment to actual integration in order to advance a formalist doctrinal
agenda.
The Court's agenda favors a type of prospective, colorblind, race neutrality
that, in reality, is neither colorblind nor race neutral. Rather, it is the same
agenda that the Supreme Court has historically chosen to pursue-an agenda in
which the interests of racial minorities are knowingly sacrificed in order to
advance the perceived interests of the white majority. Even more disturbing
than the Court's insistence that the Resegregation result was compelled by
Brown, is the insistence by Chief Justice Roberts that his new gloss on old fashioned racism was compelled by the principle of racial equality itself. Because
the attempt to equate Brown equality with this new form of Roberts's racism is
both intuitively implausible and transparently political, my hope is that the
Resegregationcase will cause the Supreme Court to begin to lose the perceived
legitimacy that is needed for the Court to continue its racially oppressive brand
of judicial review.
In DredScott and Lochner,popular opposition was ultimately sufficient to
overrule the Supreme Court's countermajoritarian political value preferences.3 18
And hopefully, the Court's preference for continued racial subordination will
soon come to be overruled as well. But I am a realist, and I understand that my
hopes may not be achieved. I remember the deafening lack of public indignation that accompanied the Supreme Court's decision to choose the next
President of the United States in Bush v. Gore.3 19 And I realize that, depending
on how the question is phrased in opinion polls, many members of the public
remain untroubled by the Court's Resegregation decision as well.3 20 It is
unrealistic to expect a culture to behave in a way that is different from the way
that the culture is at heart, and the Supreme Court's racially oppressive judicial

3t

s Dred Scott was ultimately "overruled" by the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment,

and Lochner was ultimately "overruled" by the New Deal. See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at
456-60, 755-62 (discussing DredScott and Lochner).
319 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a Florida Supreme
Court order to recount votes in the extremely close 2000 presidential election, thereby enabling
George
W. Bush to become President of the United States).
320
See Jon Cohen, Poll Results Can Ride on Wording, WASH. POST, Aug 17, 2007, at A2
(reporting that majority of registered voters either agree with or oppose Resegregation case,
depending on wording of poll).
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review may simply be a part of the culture. But being a realist does not
inevitably preclude the possibility of hope.

